Monday, July 25, 2016

Evononsense and Homo Paleas

I was just looking at Evonomics.com, an important new source of misinformation about economics. Numerous essays there talk about how economic analysis is based on the study of homo economicus, a creature that is only concerned about its own selfish material interest.  

More specifically:
homo economicus… is the character that inhabits the economics texts, and the computer models that are the silent dictators of analysis and policy. Econ, as I will call him, is a myopic integer of self-seeking, who goes through life with a relentless and unfailing calculus of personal loss and gain. He has no social affinities, is oblivious of social context, and has no capacity or inclination to think of anyone besides him or her self.” (Jonathan Rowe at Evonomics)

It is easy to see how foolish those economists are and what a waste of time economics is. There is only one small problem. The imaginary being is not homo economicus, it is homo paleas. Homo paleas is an imaginary economist created by people who want to criticize economics without having to go to the trouble of studying what economists actually do.
Economists generally do analyze models in which people are assumed to maximize utility, but these people can get utility from anything they like. No real economist says that you can’t get utility from someone else’s pleasure, or, for that matter, someone else’s pain.

What have economists actually said?

Adam Smith wrote in his Theory of Moral Sentiments that
“How selfish soever a man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though h derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.”

Well, Smith was special. It must have been after him that economists starting studying homo economicus. What did Alfred Marshall say?

Alfred Marshall wrote in his Principles of Economics that
“Thus though it is true that "money" or "general purchasing power" or "command over material wealth," is the centre around which economic science clusters; this is so, not because money or material wealth is regarded as the main aim of human effort, nor even as affording the main subject-matter for the study of the economist, but because in this world of ours it is the one convenient means of measuring human motive on a large scale. If the older economists had made this clear, they would have escaped many grievous misrepresentations; and the splendid teachings of Carlyle and Ruskin as to the right aims of human endeavour and the right uses of wealth, would not then have been marred by bitter attacks on economics, based on the mistaken belief that that science had no concern with any motive except the selfish desire for wealth, or even that it inculcated a policy of sordid selfishness.” (Book I Ch. II).

Okay, it wasn’t Marshall. Maybe economists now think that people can’t care about others.

In 2011, Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, Hoffman and List explained that
“where economics provides its most basic predictions revolves around how people should respond to changes in incentives—pecuniary or nonpecuniary (Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini 2000)—not whether subjects have fairness, spite, or altruistic proclivities.” (Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games)

Because they analyze the actions of the imaginary homo paleas rather than actual economists, these critics of economics think they have shown the weakness of economics when they point out that people vote, or give to charity, or are willing to incur a cost to punish economic experiments are concerned with fairness. The trouble is that there is actually nothing in economics that suggests a person cannot care about other people.

Economics theory does not suggest that people should not give to charity. It suggests that people will do it more if you lower the cost by, for instance giving a charitable deduction.

Tuesday, July 19, 2016

Some New Stuff

Here is the program for the Development of the American Economy section of the NBER summer Institute. There are links to many of the papers.

Here is the program for a conference on the history of capitalism. Although I have been critical of much of what has been labeled the new history of capitalism, there are some interesting looking papers here. I don't plan to go to the conference, but I look forward to seeing Sharon Murphy's work on bank financing and slavery at some time in the future.

Here is Jeffrey Beall blogging about a new paper on open access publishing (particularly the fraudulent form of it) by my colleague Margaret Ray. He provides a link to the paper.

Based upon this tweet, it appears that someone at Cornell's History of Capitalism Camp was talking about Mary Eschelbach Hansen's work on bankruptcy. She is, by the way, my favorite economic historian.

Saturday, July 16, 2016

Stanley Fish on Historians Against Trump

The New York Times published a remarkably dishonest essay by Stanley Fish. Fish attacks a group of historians for publishing a statement opposing Donald Trump.
Fish begins by making clear that, while he is specifically attacking these historians, his remarks really apply to all professors. Ironically, the historians make clear in their letter that they are not all professors. Even casual examination of the list of historians reveals that many are not professors. But Fish won’t let details like that get in his way. (quotes from Fish are in bold)
“PROFESSORS are at it again, demonstrating in public how little they understand the responsibilities and limits of their profession.”
Fish claims that
“They suggest that they are uniquely qualified to issue this warning because they “have a professional obligation as historians to share an understanding of the past upon which a better future may be built.”
This is a really nice touch. Fish has taken a quote from the letter, but introduced it with a lie. Nowhere in the letter is it explicitly or implicitly suggested that historians are uniquely qualified. To the contrary, the letter refers to other groups that have already issued similar letters.
This is followed by some more cutting, pasting and inserting by Professor Fish. He is, after all, Professor Fish, which is the reason is being published in the New York Times.
Or in other words: We’re historians and you’re not, and “historians understand the impact these phenomena have upon society’s most vulnerable.” Therefore we can’t keep silent, for “the lessons of history compel us to speak out against Trump.”
I’ll just include this statement about extraordinary hubris for the enjoyment of anyone that knows who Stanley Fish. I wouldn’t be surprised if Fish himself didn’t get a good laugh out of it.
I would say that the hubris of these statements was extraordinary were it not so commonplace for professors (not all but many) to regularly equate the possession of an advanced degree with virtue.
He then returns to his assertion that the historian’s claim to be uniquely qualified.
The claim is not simply that disciplinary expertise confers moral and political superiority, but that historians, because of their training, are uniquely objective observers: “As historians, we consider diverse viewpoints while acknowledging our own limitations and subjectivity.”
In fact, no such claim of uniqueness is made in the letter. They don’t say that all historians oppose Trump and they don’t say that only historians are in a position to evaluate Trump. They simply state that they are historians and that their position as historians has led them to believe that they should oppose Trump.
Historians do have to consider diverse viewpoints and acknowledge their own limitations and subjectivity. They don’t all do it well. I spend plenty of time criticizing bad historical scholarship, but that criticism presumes that historians should consider diverse viewpoints and acknowledge their limitations and subjectivity.

In the interest of acknowledging my own subjectivity, I probably should acknowledge that I hate Trump with the white hot passion of a thousand burning suns. But the evidence that Fish is lying is clear. Simply read the letter.

The Rise and Fall of American Economic Growth

I finally got around to reading Robert Gordon’s Rise and Fall of American Economic Growth. It is an excellent book. Much of the book is essentially an expansion of Lebergott’s Pursuing Happiness. It describes the many ways in which the material conditions of life (what they consumed, how they worked, and their health) were transformed from 1870 to 1970. Gordon argues that economic growth this period essentially created modern economic life: comfortable homes with electricity and clean water, cars parked out front, and all of this purchased with less labor hours and less onerous labor. 

Much of the attention the book has received has focused on Gordon’s argument that current innovations in information and communication are not transforming life the way the earlier changes did and that the rate of growth is unlikely to return to the rapid pace experienced for most of the twentieth century. This argument actually occupies a relatively small part of the book. I also found this part of the argument to be somewhat more cautiously stated than I think it has been in the popular press and in blurbs for the book. While Gordon argues that some of these innovations were uniquely transforming and points to specific factors that he believes are likely to slow growth (e.g. demographic change, education, inequality), he also has suggestions for policy changes which might mitigate some of these headwinds (e.g. reducing excessive regulation, policies to reduce inequality). In other words, he doesn’t appear to believe that the current course is inevitable. He also acknowledges that any attempts to make predictions about future innovations are somewhat speculative.

His analysis of the causes of the “Great Leap Forward” also seems reasonable, though I think he gives too much credit to Alex Field for pointing out the technological innovations that took place during the Great Depression and not enough to Michael Bernstein, who emphasized these changes long before Field.

I do tend to disagree with Gordon and others who underplay the transformation brought about by information technology. You can say that it is only entertainment and communication but my children ages 17, 23 and 27 are never without their phones. They use social media, they watch movies and tv shows. They listen to an incredible variety of music. When I was a teenager you pretty much had to pick one kind of music: heavy metal, or punk, or disco. My kids listen to everything. They listen to podcasts on soccer, cooking, politics, etc. They can’t get lost. A map is no further than the phone. Maybe it is just entertainment and information, but it is a world of information and entertainment in their hand.

I agree with Gordon that attempts to make predictions about future innovations are speculative, but I tend to be somewhat more optimistic than he is. In part, my optimism stems from the dismal performance of dire predictions about the future. Read Jevon’s on the Coal Question, or Alvin Hansen on secular stagnation.


Part of my optimism is also related to what I think might be the chief weakness of the book. It tells the story strictly from an American standpoint. The problem with this is that the same things happened in many other countries. The United States is not the only wealthy country. One of the things that I believe I learned from John Nye (listen to John’s Econ Talk on the Great Depression, Political Economy and the Evolution of the State) is that you might want to occasionally look outside of particular area to see if the same thing is happening in other places. If it is, you might want to ask what are the broader forces at work. I think that if innovations can travel across borders and innovation is not isolated to Americans there are some good reasons to be optimistic. Increased economic freedom and access to education in Asia have the potential to dramatically increase the pool of innovators. I don’t think that economic freedom is firmly enough established to feel completely secure about this, but I think the potential is great.

Sunday, July 3, 2016

Robin Hanson on Slavery

Robin Hanson and Bryan Caplan were having an argument about something called “Em.” I have no idea what Em is so I am not writing about that. But the argument had something to do with slavery, and it prompted Hanson to do a quick review of the literature and write up a summary on his blog overcoming bias. I’m afraid that Hanson’s quick review of the literature was a bit too quick. Some of the statements are simply wrong and others can reasonably be contested. I posted these responses on his blog, but it did not seem to keep the links. Consequently, I'm posting it here as well.

He states that
Historically, even when slaves were common, they were usually a minority of the population. (Beware, the term “slave” is used in different ways.) About 10% in the Roman Empire and US south.

This statement is simply incorrect. Slaves accounted for substantially more than 10 percent of the population of the South. Slaves were as much as 57 percent of the population (South Caroline) and at least 25 percent (Tennessee). See, for instance, Jenny Wahl. Or you can check at the Historical Census Browser at UVA

He states that
(The sex story is overrated, as only 1-2% of slave babies were fathered by white men.)
The first thing to note is that, unlike population, the number of children born to slave mothers and white fathers is difficult to estimate. Some estimates put it as low as 1-2 percent, but Stephen Crawford found that in ex-slave interviews, by the WPA and Fisk University, as many 10 percent of slaves reported that their father was white. The 10 percent figure was when the interviews were done by African –American interviewers. In other words we don’t know. It may be possible use genetic studies to produce a more accurate estimate, but I don’t know of such a study. There is also the question of “How large is large?” Stating that “the sex story is overrated” suggests that 1-2 percent is somehow not important. Given that the vast majority of enslaved people in the South lived on plantations of 15 or more people, even 1 or 2 percent could be consistent with a relatively large percentage of slave owners fathering an enslaved child (or a smaller percentage fathering numerous children). It is not obvious to me that 1 or 2 percent is small in this case.      

He states that
Sometimes people sold themselves into slavery for a limited time, as with indentured servitude.
This is just kind of odd. It may be that he is using a definition of slavery that makes this make sense, but I don’t know of any historian who regards slavery and indentured servitude as equivalent.

Finally, he states that
Slaves weren’t converted into debt perhaps because of credit market failures, or more plausible because the full control approach was especially productive on plantations.

I’m not entirely clear about what this means, but it does not sound consistent with current understanding of slavery in the United States. Historians have devoted considerable attention to the well developed credit markets that facilitated slave purchases. See for instance, recent work by Bonnie Martin, John Clegg, Calvin Schemerhorn, Kathryn Boodry, and Gonzalez, Marshall, and Naidu.

Friday, June 17, 2016

Some Random Economic History

The Program of the next meeting of the Economic History Association.

The Economic History Society now has a blog: The Long Run

Pseudoerasmus attempts to describe the essence of Beckert’s argument about economic development in Empire of Cotton

Ed Baptist explains how he was able to misinform so many people.

Jane Humphries examines the role of women in English economic history and gives a lesson in the use of primary sources in economic history.


At Ben Franklin’s World Liz Covart and Zara Anashanslin also discuss the use of primary sources, particularly in reference to Anashanslin’s book  Portrait of a Woman in Silk: Hidden Histories of the British Atlantic World

Saturday, June 11, 2016

Fugitive Slave Ads and the Runaway New History of Capitalism

The OAH recently tweeted about a new post at the Process blog.  The tweet asked if runaway slave ads can change the way we study slavery.The post is authored by Mary Niall Mitchell, Edward Baptist, and Joshua Rothman, and it describes their new project to create a database of digitized fugitive slave ads:

“Most historians of chattel slavery looking for detailed information about individual enslaved people have turned to a familiar constellation of sources: nineteenth-century slave narratives, the Ex-Slave Narratives gathered in the 1930s and 1940s by the Works Progress Administration, plantation records, and legal documents. We hope that this is about to change, by bringing new and existing digital techniques to a type of narrative that ran daily on the pages of American newspapers from the eighteenth century until the Civil War: the fugitive slave advertisement.”

“By 1865, we estimate more than 200,000 such notices appeared.”

It is possible that there are 200,000 such notices. It seems plausible to me, though I would be more willing to accept it if I was not familiar with Ed Baptist’s technique for creating quantitative estimates. He makes them up.

Although they do mention the work of Loren Schweinger and John Hope Franklin on runaway slaves the overall impression that the authors leave is that little has been done to make use of these valuable pieces of evidence. After all, “historians …. have turned to a familiar constellation of sources,” but they “ hope that this is about to change” as a result of their work. It is this implication that they are boldly going where no historians have gone before that is the problem.  There are already a number of extensive collections of digitized fugitive slave ads that, unlike their project, are already available to people. Moreover, historians have long regarded fugitive slave ads as an important source. Some economic historians have created databases including tens of thousands of ads to conduct their research. Bellow I provide a list of some of the digitization projects and historical scholarship related to runaway slave ads.

Can runaway slave ads change the way we study slavery? Yes. I know this because they already have. Why don’t the authors just acknowledge the contributions of the numerous scholars that have already worked on fugitive slave ads? They could simply state that despite all these previous efforts none has yet created a truly comprehensive database that is accessible to everyone. That would be true, and if they were able to create such a database it would be a considerable achievement. But that is not the way of the new history of capitalism. Instead, the approach is to ignore or deny the work of earlier scholars in order to claim false novelty for their own work. 


The North Carolina Runaway Slave Advertisements project provides online access to all known runaway slave advertisements (more than 2300 items) published in North Carolina newspapers from 1751 to 1840. These brief ads provide a glimpse into the social, economic, and cultural world of the American slave system and the specific experience within North Carolina. Working from microfilmed copies of these rare publications, the project team scanned the ads to provide digital images, create full-text transcripts and descriptive metadata, and develop a searchable database. The NCRSA website includes digital scans of the ads, contextual essays to address their historical research value, full text transcripts, an annotated bibliography to aid researchers, and a searchable database.

“The Texas Runaway Slave Project (TRSP) is a database of runaway slave advertisements, articles and notices from newspapers published in Texas. The project has so far documented the names of over 1400 runaway slaves from Texas.

The “Louisiana Runaway Slave Advertisements, 1836-1865” collection is a comprehensive digital collection of advertisements and notices harvested from the newspapers digitized as part of the Digitizing Louisiana Newspapers Project.  In these advertisements people from Louisiana and the Lower Mississippi Valley demonstrate their agency and resistance against the institutions of slavery and indentured servitude.

The project team identified and cropped advertisements directly from the digital newspaper images, and they created full-text transcriptions and descriptive metadata.”


The Documenting Runaway Slaves (DRS) research project is a collaborative effort to document newspaper advertisements placed by masters seeking the capture and return of runaway slaves. Dr. Max Grivno and Dr. Douglas Chambers, lead researchers and faculty members in the Southern Miss Department of History, are focusing their pilot project on Mississippi, but plans are already in place to expand the research to the larger Gulf South, the rest of the southern United States, the Caribbean, and Brazil.

“The Geography of Slavery in Virginia is a digital collection of advertisements for runaway and captured slaves and servants in 18th- and 19th-century Virginia newspapers. Building on the rich descriptions of individual slaves and servants in the ads, the project offers a personal, geographical and documentary context for the study of slavery in Virginia, from colonial times to the Civil War.”

Hodges, Graham Russell, and Alan Edward Brown. " Pretends to be Free": Runaway Slave Advertisements from Colonial and Revolutionary New York and New Jersey. Taylor & Francis, 1994.

Smith, Billy Gordon, and Richard Wojtowicz. Blacks who Stole Themselves: Advertisments for Runaways in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 1728-1790. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989.
Prude, Jonathan. "To Look upon the" Lower Sort": Runaway Ads and the Appearance of Unfree Laborers in America, 1750-1800." The Journal of American History 78.1 (1991): 124-159.

Dittmar, Jeremiah, and Suresh Naidu. Contested Property: Fugitive Slaves in the Antebellum US South. Working paper, Columbia University (September 2012), 2012. Dittmar and Naidu collected more than 20,000 ads.

Komlos, John. "The Height of Runaway Slaves in Colonial America, 1720-1770." Stature, Living Standards, and Economic Development: Essays in Anthropometric History, ed. John Komlos (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) (1994): 93-116. Komlos collected more than 10,000 ads.


Tuesday, June 7, 2016

Loan Sharks



(Chicago Tribune Nov. 7, 1897)

Discussion about restricting payday lending has been in the news recently.


We first became interested in how states regulated attempts to collect debts from wage earners because bankruptcy rates look like this (see Hansen and Hansen 2012) Where it is easy to collect a large portion of someone’s wages people are more likely to file for bankruptcy.



As best I can tell, something like payday lending has existed about as long as paydays have existed. And as long as there has been payday lending, people have worried about the negative consequences of it and tried to place restrictions on it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many state legislatures restricted the ability to use garnishment or wage assignment. A wage assignment was a written statement that allowed the lender to collect from your employer if you did not pay. Some states prohibited wage assignments, others required spousal approval, or placed limits on the amount of wages that could be assigned. Some employers also attempted to prevent them. Armour, for instance required employees to sign a statement saying they would not assign their wages.
One problem states faced in regulating small lending was due process challenges. In addition to the due process clause in U.S. constitution many states also have due process clauses in their constitutions. The legal arguments involved substantive due process, which tends to raise fundamental questions about the appropriate role and operation of government. (See Hansen and Hansen 2014 on the evolution of garnishment and wage assignment in Illinois)

Due process clauses tend to say something like “no one may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” The first thing to note is that you can be deprived life, liberty and property. It just has to be done the right way. What does due process mean? There are two aspects: procedural due process and substantive due process. Procedural is what most people tend to think of when they think of due process. Did the state follow the rules? Did you, for instance, have access to an attorney? You will not find substantive due process in the constitution. It is a name given to what courts were doing. Consequently, people can disagree about exactly what it is. The description that best fits cases that I have read is that the court asks if the regulation is a reasonable means to obtain a legitimate public purpose. So, in the case of wage assignment restrictions, there was no question that the rights of the wage earner and the lender were being restricted. The problem to court faced was determining whether the restriction was a reasonable means to obtain legitimate public purpose. Some courts said that there was no state interest in interfering with how a grown man used his wages. Others said that there was a legitimate public purpose because loan sharks impoverished the working poor who then became a burden on the public. Behind the question of whether a regulation of “loan sharks” is a legitimate public purpose is an even more fundamental question: Who decides what a legitimate public purpose is?  Is it the legislature or the court? Courts went back and forth on this until the 1930s. Since the 1930s, courts have made a distinction between what they regard as economic rights and what they regard as civil rights. On economic rights they defer to the legislature. Consequently, cases like Kelo that may surprise the public should not surprise people familiar with American legal history.    I think legislatures are generally less restricted in their ability to regulate small lenders than they were in the early twentieth century. Moreover, the federal government been in the business of trying to eliminate loan sharks at least since the 1968 Consumer Credit Protection Act. 

On the other hand, I don’t think the fundamental economics has changed much. There are three basic problems: low income people often need to borrow money, they have no security for a loan other than their future wages (and sometimes a car), and it is expensive to lend to low income people. As I noted before, the problem is not new. People often focus on the interest rates and suggest that lenders are making extraordinary profits by exploiting the poor. The alternative explanation is that the interest rates are high because the cost of providing such loans is high. I tend to lean toward the second explanation. The primary reason I lean toward the second explanation is that I don’t see substantial barriers to entry in small lending. If a lender is making extraordinary profits by lending at an implicit rate of say 30%, why doesn’t another lender enter the market, charge 28%, attract all the customers, and make a real killing? Why don’t banks enter the market? They have reputation for liking profits. Moreover, why doesn’t someone start a non-profit payday lender? The non-profit should be able to easily cover its costs and provide lower cost loans to people. Actually, people have tried things like this and failed. They found that it was more costly than they anticipated. There are several good reasons why it is costly. First, the loans are small, which means the administrative cost tend to be a large fraction of the loan. Second, unlike banks that lend other people’s money, payday lenders lend their own money, and thus have a lower rate of return on capital.

So, what should be done? I don’t know. What I do know is that getting rid of payday lenders will not get rid of the need that low income people often have to borrow, and the more that you restrict legal options, the more room there will be for illegal options. What we shouldn't do is take away the option without providing an alternative and then pat ourselves on the back as if we solved the problem.



P.S. Usury laws have also restricted the ability to legally make loans to low income wage earners. They existed throughout most of American history (see Rockoff 2003 on the history of usury laws and Benmelech and Moskowitz 2010   on the political economy of usury laws.