Mary and I wrote an op-ed about the possibility of using bankruptcy law to reduce the economic impact of the pandemic that was published by the Washington Post's Made by History.
We found out this morning that we won the first in a series of prizes that the Stanton Foundation is awarding for applied history articles related to the pandemic.
Tuesday, April 28, 2020
Wednesday, March 25, 2020
Thursday, March 19, 2020
Tuesday, March 3, 2020
Some Thoughts On the United States as a Developing Nation
There is a lot of anxiety about the state of the economy.
Coronavirus is spreading, the stock market is falling, treasury yields have
reached an all time low. So, of course, I decided to write a long post
about the American economy in the early nineteenth century.
In "The United States as a DevelopingNation: Revisiting the Peculiarities of American History." Past & Present (2019) Link
and Maggor seek to direct our attention toward the peculiarity of America’s economic
history by encouraging us to consider the United States in the first half of
the nineteenth century as a developing country. They also suggest that the key
to understanding this transformation may lie in industrial development policies
at the state level. Link and Maggor encourage historians to think about the
United States as a developing country, and how it escaped from the path
followed by other developing countries. So, this post is me thinking about the
U.S. as a developing nation.
On one hand, the U.S. was obviously
a developing country. On the eve of the Civil War, real GDP per capita was
still just under $3,000 (in 2012 dollars). Currently GDP per capita around $3,000
would place you around countries like the Philippines, not the bottom but well
below high income countries. If we take this perspective, however, all countries
were developing in the early nineteenth century, and the term would not have
much value. By 1850, the United States was already among the highest income
countries. It ranked high in GDP, GDP per capita, industrial production,
literacy, and school attendance. By most measures the U.S was one of the most
developed countries in the World by the mid-nineteenth century.
The United States as a Developing Country?
Estimates of income and output
before the twentieth century are difficult, and reasonable people can disagree
about them. Making international comparisons adds to the difficulty. But the
disagreements are about where the U.S ranks among the top countries, not
whether it is one of them.
The United States had among the
highest levels of per capita output in the World at its founding. By the middle
of the nineteenth century, rapid population and continuing increases in per
capita output gave the United States the 5th highest total GDP. China
and India depended upon their large populations to place them at the top of the
list. The US, like the UK and France had both a large population and high GDP
per capita.
Table 1. Aggregate Product Relative to American
1850
|
1870
|
1890
|
1913
|
|
U.K.
|
1.42
|
.97
|
.67
|
.41
|
France
|
1.43
|
.73
|
.44
|
.28
|
Germany
|
.45
|
.45
|
.33
|
.28
|
China
|
1.90
|
1.09
|
.58
|
|
India
|
2.42
|
1.20
|
.66
|
.32
|
Australia
|
.03
|
.06
|
.07
|
.05
|
Argentina
|
.02
|
.03
|
.06
|
|
Canada
|
.07
|
.06
|
.05
|
.06
|
Source: Gallman 2000, 3 and 4.
Table 2. Average Annual rate of Growth of Real GDP 1820-1913
Argentina
|
6.0 (1870-1913)
|
U.S.A.
|
4.1
|
Canada
|
3.8 (1850-1913
|
Australia
|
3.5 (1870-1913)
|
Netherlands
|
2.4
|
Germany
|
2.4
|
Denmark
|
2.3
|
Belgium
|
2.1
|
Finland
|
2.1
|
Brazil
|
2.0
|
U.K.
|
2.0
|
Source: Gallman 2000, 5.
Table 3. Per Capita Output Relative to American
1850
|
1870
|
1890
|
1913
|
|
UK
|
1.3
|
1.33
|
1.21
|
.95
|
Netherlands
|
1.04
|
1.07
|
.99
|
.78
|
Belgium
|
.99
|
1.07
|
.99
|
.78
|
Denmark
|
.93
|
.78
|
.71
|
.71
|
France
|
.92
|
.76
|
.69
|
.65.
|
China
|
.21
|
.18
|
.13
|
|
India
|
.30
|
.23
|
.18
|
.12
|
Australia
|
1.69
|
1.55
|
1.41
|
1.04
|
Argentina
|
.53
|
.63
|
.72
|
|
Canada
|
.70
|
.66
|
.66
|
.79
|
Source: Gallman 2000, 20.
Lindert and Williamson estimate
that real incomes in the United States were higher than England during the late
colonial era, fell during the Revolution, passed the UK again in the early
1800s, but then fell back again during the Civil War.
Source: https://voxeu.org/article/american-growth-and-inequality-1700
Agriculture was the most important
sector of the American economy in the first half of the nineteenth century. Though
it should be noted that by 1850 services accounted for about 40% of output,
leaving 60% for commodities, and agriculture accounted for about 60% of
commodity output. So, agriculture accounted for about 36% of total output (for
sources see
here). Although agriculture was still the most important sector, the United
States was already one of the largest industrial economies by the middle of the
nineteenth century.
Table 4. Leading Countries in Total Manufacturing Output
(index numbers relative to U.K. = 100 in 1900)
1860
|
1913
|
United Kingdom 45
|
United States 298
|
China 44
|
Germany 138
|
India 19
|
United Kingdom 127
|
France 18
|
Russia 77
|
United States 16
|
France 57
|
Source Bairoch 1982, 284
Table 5. Leading Countries in Per Capita Manufacturing
output (level relative to UK=100 in 1900)
1860
|
1913
|
United Kingdom 64
|
United States 126
|
Belgium 28
|
United Kingdom 115
|
Switzerland 26
|
Belgium 88
|
United States 21
|
Switzerland 87
|
France 20
|
Germany 85
|
Source: Bairoch 1982, 286
Table 6: Productivity in manufacture equaled
or exceed the UK by the 1840s.
Agriculture
|
Manufacturing
|
Services
|
Total
|
|
1839/1841
|
78.1
|
159.7
|
84.8
|
93.8
|
1849/1851
|
98.9
|
162.7
|
65.2
|
89.9
|
1859/1861
|
100.0
|
152.8
|
73.0
|
95.0
|
1969/1871
|
92.4
|
145.1
|
77.4
|
94.0
|
1879/1881
|
103.9
|
146.3
|
103.6
|
98.1
|
1889/1891
|
96.7
|
167.8
|
104.1
|
100.3
|
1899/1901
|
112.0
|
170.9
|
116.1
|
114.8
|
Source: Broadberry and Irwin 2006, 261
The growth of industrial extended
back to the 18th century and took place at a steady pace. The figure below show Davis index of industrial production
.
Industrial production in the U.S.,
like GDP per capita, began the nineteenth century at relatively high levels and
continued to grow rapidly.
In addition to income and industrial
production, the United States was one of the leading countries in educational
attainment by the mid-nineteenth century.
Table 7. Adult Literacy in selected countries
Country
|
Ca.
1850
|
Ca.
1900
|
Sweden
|
90
|
99
|
United
States
|
85-90
|
94
|
Scotland
|
80
|
97
|
Prussia
|
80
|
88
|
England
and Wales
|
67-70
|
96
|
France
|
55-60
|
83
|
Austria
|
55-60
|
77
|
Belgium
|
55-60
|
81
|
Italy
|
20-25
|
52
|
Spain
|
20
|
44
|
Russia
|
5-10
|
28
|
Source: Cameron 1993,
220
Table 8. Primary School Enrollment per 10,000 pop.
Country
|
1830
|
1850
|
1900
|
United
States
|
1500
|
1800
|
1969
|
Germany
|
1700
|
1600
|
1576
|
United
Kingdom
|
900
|
1045
|
1407
|
France
|
700
|
930
|
1412
|
Spain
|
400
|
663
|
1038
|
Italy
|
300
|
463 (1860)
|
881
|
Russia
|
98 (1870)
|
348
|
Source: Cameron 1993, 220
The Position of the U.S. in the Global Economy
The United States was one of the
leading economies on almost every dimension by 1850, but Link and Maggor
emphasized a different aspect of the economy: its position in the global
economy. Its exports were dominated by
primary goods, and one product dominated all others:
"In 1850, the US was primarily a supplier of
slave-produced cotton to industrializing Europe. American economic growth thus
remained embedded in established patterns of Atlantic commerce. One hundred
years later, the same country had become the world’s undisputed industrial
leader and hegemonic provider of capital.”
They go on to note that
“The very triumph of the US has obscured how peculiar
this trajectory, in fact, was. Not only did the US overcome its status as a
peripheral exporter of cash crops; it also managed to defy the global division
of labour that buttressed the liberal–imperial world order of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. That era’s ‘Great Specialization’
(Findlay and O’Rourke), moulded by European and particularly British imperialism,
divided the world into exporters of raw materials and primary products, on the
one hand, and exporters of manufactured goods, on the other. Under this
division of labour, the industrial core, primarily in Western Europe, turned
ever more intensely to manufacturing, drawing for raw materials and
agricultural produce on the resources of other countries far and wide.
Countries elsewhere around the world, in turn, exported primary commodities in
return for European finished goods. The trajectory of the US, however, ran
askew of this divide. Neither core nor periphery, the country simultaneously
exported an ever-growing stream of raw materials and agricultural produce while
also rapidly industrializing. By the First World War, this former slave-owning,
cotton-producing republic had become a net exporter of manufactured goods.”
Like the United States, Argentina and Australia both had
high levels of GDP per capita and growth during periods in the nineteenth
century, but then experienced extended periods of stagnation from the late 19th
century to the mid -20th century.
I still think there are a couple of
problems with this perspective on the U.S as a developing country. First, although
the United States became a net-exporter of manufactured goods, its most
valuable exports continued to be primary products, especially cotton. Exports
of machinery did not begin to surpass exports of cotton until the 1930s.
Table 9. Value of selected exports in 1911
Export
|
Millions
$s
|
Cotton
|
585
|
Wheat
|
77
|
Petroleum
|
105
|
Machinery
|
151
|
Iron
and Steel
|
79
|
Automobiles
|
16
|
Source Historical Statistics EE569-589
Moreover, the foreign sector was a relatively small part of
the U.S. economy. Link and Maggor emphasize the atypicality of the U.S.’s
shifting role in the global economy, but another way in which the U.S. was
atypical was its relative self-sufficiency. In Argentina before the WWI the
foreign sector equaled more half of GDP (Campos https://voxeu.org/article/riddle-argentina).
The foreign sector not only accounted for a smaller fraction of GDP than
developing countries, it accounted for a noticeably smaller percentage of GDP
than in the developed countries in Western Europe (See Table 10). The foreign sector as a share of GDP was small
and declining in the nineteenth century. Focusing on the U.S role as an
exporter of primary product may make sense in terms of understanding its role
in the international economy, but it is not clear that its role in the international
economy was a central part of the economy.
Table 10. Foreign Sector as a Percentage of National Product
Country
|
Date
|
Percent
|
Date
|
Percent
|
UK
|
1837-45
|
26
|
1909-13
|
51.5
|
France
|
1845-54
|
21.9
|
1908-10
|
35.2
|
Germany
|
1872-79
|
36.7
|
1910-13
|
38.3
|
Canada
|
1870-80
|
30.9
|
1911-13
|
32.2
|
Australia
|
1861-70
|
53.4
|
1911-13
|
41.9
|
U.S
|
1834-43
|
14.5
|
1904-13
|
12.2
|
Source: Kuznets 1967, 19-20.
Variation Within the United States
How
does one reconcile the picture I have presented of the United States as one of
the most developed countries with Link and Maggor’s characterization of the
United States as a developing country? One possibility is that the United
States was both. It was two economies. One was a developing country,
dominated by agricultural exports, lack of industrialization, and low levels of
education and innovation. The other was one of the leading countries in income,
industry, education and innovation. A distinctive feature of the United States
in the middle of the nineteenth century was the extent to which the features associated
with underdevelopment were associated with one part of the country, the South,
and the features associated with the North.
This, of course, is not a new
argument. The view that the South was some sort of “colonial dependency was one
of the primary targets of Fogel and Engerman in Time on the Cross. While
Fogel changed his position on a number of issues by the time he finished Without
Consent or Contract, this was not one of them. He still argued that high
incomes and rapid growth of per capita income in the South between 1840 and
1860 underscored “the dubious nature of attempts to classify the South as a
‘colonial dependency.’” Several authors have suggested that Fogel and Engerman overstated
the case. First, Wright (1978) argued that 1840 and 1860 census years were not
representative; 1840 was below trend and 1860 was above trend. Consequently, differences between those two
years would tend to exaggerate growth. Second, Cohn (1981) argued that the
Fogel and Engerman estimates, like the Easterlin estimates before them,
mis-measured services, and that reasonable corrections eliminate the advantage of
the South over the Midwest. Third, I think some of the comparisons Fogel makes
are somewhat misleading. He notes that only some parts of the North had higher
incomes than the South, but the more than half the U.S. population lived in New
England and the Mid Atlantic, the North’s high income areas, while only 6
percent lived in the Southwest Central, per capita incomes in the other
subregions of the South were below the lowest subregion in the North.
I tend to lean toward the Ransom
and Sutch side on the debate about the economic development of the South:
“Economic
historians have portrayed the South as a modern, well developed economy that
utilized its comparative advantage in staple crops to produce a per capita
income that ranked among the richest economies of the world in the middle of
the nineteenth century. However, this interpretation of the South as a “modern”
economy in the mid-nineteenth century rests on a very narrow interpretation of
the available measures of economic activity. Even if we grant that the southern
economy experienced high levels of income growth in the antebellum period, the
fact remains that the continued growth of the southern economy depended on
continued expansion into new lands in the west; a sustained demand for cotton
in the industrial world, and the preservation of a chattel labor system that
stifled investment.” (Ransom and Sutch 2001, 265).
Table 11. Income per capita (1840$s)
Source: Lindert and Williamson 2016, 102.
Table 12. Growth of Per capita Income (% per annum)
1800-50
|
1850-60
|
1800-60
|
|
New
England
|
2.20
|
.65
|
1.94
|
Mid
Atlantic
|
1.58
|
2.10
|
1.66
|
East
North Central
|
1.31
|
||
West
North Central
|
2.29
|
||
South
Atlantic
|
.70
|
1.93
|
.90
|
East
South Central
|
2.58
|
||
West
South Central
|
1.98
|
||
Mountain
|
1.57
|
||
Pacific
|
-6.31
|
||
1.74
|
1.48
|
||
1.79
|
1.42
|
Source: Lindert and Williamson2016, 102. States included in
each census region can be found here.
The
North clearly held the lead in industrialization as well. The table below shows
the value added in manufacturing in each state in 1850. Free states, which
accounted for about 2/3 of the population accounted for more than 80% of value
added in manufacturing. Moreover, the manufacturing activity in the South was
mostly located in the border states of Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and
Missouri, three of which, although slave states, did not secede.
Table 13. Manufacturing Output, 1850
Free States
|
Value of Manufactures $s
|
% of Total
|
Slave States
|
Value of Manufactures $s
|
% of Total
|
|
New York
|
237,597,249
|
23.50%
|
Maryland
|
32,477,702
|
3.21%
|
|
Pennsylvania
|
155,044,910
|
15.33%
|
Virginia
|
29,705,387
|
2.94%
|
|
Massachusetts
|
151,137,145
|
14.95%
|
Kentucky
|
24,588,483
|
2.43%
|
|
Ohio
|
62,647,259
|
6.20%
|
Missouri
|
23,749,265
|
2.35%
|
|
Connecticut
|
45,110,102
|
4.46%
|
Tennessee
|
9,728,438
|
0.96%
|
|
New Jersey
|
39,713,586
|
3.93%
|
North Carolina
|
9,111,245
|
0.90%
|
|
Maine
|
24,664,135
|
2.44%
|
Louisiana
|
7,320,948
|
0.72%
|
|
New Hampshire
|
23,164,503
|
2.29%
|
Georgia
|
7,086,525
|
0.70%
|
|
Rhode Island
|
22,093,258
|
2.19%
|
South Carolina
|
7,063,513
|
0.70%
|
|
Indiana
|
18,922,651
|
1.87%
|
Delaware
|
4,649,296
|
0.46%
|
|
Illinois
|
17,236,073
|
1.70%
|
Alabama
|
4,528,878
|
0.45%
|
|
California
|
12,862,522
|
1.27%
|
Mississippi
|
2,972,038
|
0.29%
|
|
Michigan
|
10,976,894
|
1.09%
|
Texas
|
1,165,538
|
0.12%
|
|
Wisconsin
|
9,293,068
|
0.92%
|
Florida
|
668,335
|
0.07%
|
|
Vermont
|
8,570,920
|
0.85%
|
Arkansas
|
607,436
|
0.06%
|
|
Iowa
|
3,551,783
|
0.35%
|
Total Slave
|
165,423,027
|
16.36%
|
|
Total Free
|
842,586,058
|
83.33%
|
The South also lagged the North in
educational attainment. The next table shows literacy and school attendance in
1850 ranked from highest to lowest. The same pattern can be seen in both
measures of education. New England states, followed by Mid-Atlantic and
Midwestern states, with Southern states at the bottom. The percentages are
based on the free population. Clearly the rates of education in the South would
have been even lower if they were calculated for the whole school age
population in the South.
Table 14. Literacy and School Attendance, 1850
State
|
Literacy of Free Adults
|
Literacy of All Adults
|
State
|
School Attendance
|
New Hampshire
|
98.3%
|
Maine
|
87.3%
|
|
Maine
|
97.9%
|
Vermont
|
84.9%
|
|
Connecticut
|
97.5%
|
New Hampshire
|
84.5%
|
|
Vermont
|
96.3%
|
Massachusetts
|
72.5%
|
|
Rhode Island
|
95.7%
|
Connecticut
|
71.7%
|
|
Wisconsin
|
95.7%
|
Michigan
|
69.7%
|
|
Michigan
|
95.5%
|
Ohio
|
67.1%
|
|
Massachusetts
|
95.1%
|
New York
|
65.8%
|
|
New York
|
94.0%
|
Rhode Island
|
62.9%
|
|
California
|
93.5%
|
Pennsylvania
|
59.9%
|
|
Pennsylvania
|
93.2%
|
Indiana
|
54.7%
|
|
Ohio
|
92.7%
|
Illinois
|
54.0%
|
|
New Jersey
|
92.4%
|
Wisconsin
|
53.7%
|
|
Iowa
|
90.0%
|
New Jersey
|
52.6%
|
|
Mississippi
|
89.1%
|
42.5%
|
Iowa
|
46.4%
|
Illinois
|
88.9%
|
Tennessee
|
46.2%
|
|
South Carolina
|
87.2%
|
37.6%
|
North Carolina
|
44.5%
|
Missouri
|
85.8%
|
75.8%
|
Kentucky
|
42.9%
|
Texas
|
84.5%
|
62.3%
|
Delaware
|
42.7%
|
Maryland
|
83.1%
|
71.9%
|
Missouri
|
40.5%
|
Louisiana
|
82.8%
|
43.2%
|
Mississippi
|
40.2%
|
Indiana
|
82.5%
|
Louisiana
|
37.7%
|
|
Alabama
|
81.1%
|
44.4%
|
South Carolina
|
36.2%
|
Florida
|
81.0%
|
44.5%
|
Georgia
|
35.6%
|
Georgia
|
81.0%
|
46.8%
|
Maryland
|
35.6%
|
Virginia
|
79.8%
|
54.0%
|
Alabama
|
35.4%
|
Kentucky
|
79.4%
|
63.4%
|
Arkansas
|
34.5%
|
Delaware
|
76.0%
|
74.6%
|
Texas
|
32.6%
|
Tennessee
|
75.4%
|
58.0%
|
Virginia
|
30.0%
|
Arkansas
|
74.0%
|
56.7%
|
Florida
|
26.1%
|
North Carolina
|
69.5%
|
48.1%
|
California
|
10.3%
|
Source: Social Explorer, 1850 Census
Innovation, as measured by patents, shows a similar pattern
to education: New England followed by Mid-Atlantic and Midwest, with the South
taking up the rear.
Table 15. Annual Patent Rates (patents per million
residents)
1840-49
|
1850-59
|
1860-69
|
1870-79
|
1890-91
|
1910-11
|
|
New
England
|
55.5
|
175.6
|
483.3
|
775.8
|
772
|
534.3
|
Middle
Atlantic
|
51.7
|
129.4
|
332.3
|
563.4
|
607
|
488.6
|
East
North Central
|
16.6
|
57.3
|
210.3
|
312.3
|
429.9
|
442.3
|
West
North Central
|
9.5
|
22.9
|
95.4
|
146.5
|
248.7
|
272
|
South
|
5.5
|
15.5
|
26
|
85.8
|
103.1
|
114.4
|
West
|
24.8
|
164.5
|
366.7
|
381.6
|
458.4
|
|
U.S.
Ave
|
27.5
|
91.5
|
195.7
|
325.4
|
360.4
|
334.2
|
Source: Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1999, Table 1
To what
extent are these differences due to slavery rather than other differences
between the North and South? John Majewski has tried to understand the problem
by studying slave and free areas with similar geographies. Recently he compared
the Limestone South with free areas adjacent to it. He argues that despite
agriculture, urbanization and manufacturing that resembled the Midwest more
than the rest of the South, like the rest of the slave states these areas
failed to achieve the democratization of education and innovation that
characterized the North. Even when they provided funding for education it
appears to have gone primarily to the children of the wealthiest families. For
instance, in Kentucky funding was provided based upon the number of children, but
high tuition made school impossible for poorer families, so the state funding
simply provided a subsidy to the education of the children of wealthy families.
Consequently, innovation suffered as well. Majewski found that “In 1860 alone,
Ohioans filed for 329 patents, or about 141 per million residents. Despite
having a similar economic structure as Ohio, the resident of the Limestone
South filed for fifty-two patents in 1860 or about 50 per million residents
(Majewski 2015, 293).”
Majewski’s
work emphasizes the outsize role of slaveowners in the political system even in
places where slavery was of less importance economically, a point that Egnal
emphasized. Even in states where the economy was not dominated by cotton
production, slave owners, especially large slave owners, could play a
disproportionately large role in the political system.
Table 16. Slave Ownership and Political Representation
State
|
%
white families owning slaves
|
%
lawmakers owning slaves
|
%
families owning more than 20 slaves
|
%
lawmakers owning more than 20 slaves
|
Arkansas
|
18.5
|
53.6
|
1.6
|
10.3
|
Tennessee
|
22.3
|
41
|
1.6
|
7
|
Virginia
|
30..8
|
67.1
|
3.2
|
22.9
|
Source: Egnal, Clash of Extremes, Table 7.2.
Noting the similarities between the
South and countries that relied upon exports of primary products suggests a
counterfactual. The North was already among the highest income, most
industrialized countries, but If Southern secession succeeded, what would the Confederate
States of America have looked like 50 or 100 years later. Would it look more
like the North or like Argentina, or Brazil?
Conclusion
I’m sympathetic to Link and Maggor’s
desire to develop a better understanding of the history of the American economy
that does not treat growth American growth as inevitable, as a merely an unfolding.
But the task is actually a daunting one because the most notable feature of
American economy history is that when one steps back and looks at the big
picture it does appear to be almost inevitable. The figure below shows American
per capita GDP graphed on a log scale.
When you use a log scale the slope
of the line reflects the rate of change. If you see a roughly straight line
that means that the percentage changes from year to year are relatively
constant. That is the case with the United States. What is remarkable about
this is that the U.S appears to have experienced significant structural changes
that did not alter the course of economic growth. After the Panic of 1837,
states re-wrote their constitutions and changed the way they promoted transportation
and financial development. The Civil War caused the destruction of labor and
capital, and ended slavery, wiping out much of the wealth of the South and fundamentally
altering its economic institutions. The Depressions in 1893 and 1929, led to reactions
against the political parties that had been in control that facilitated major
economic changes. The list goes on: shifts from periods of high tariffs to
periods of low tariffs, a shift from free immigration in the nineteenth century
to restricted immigration in much of the twentieth century, two World Wars, the
Cold War, and the expansion of federal government relative to state and local
governments, central bank or no central bank, state banks or federal banks. Nothing appears to make any difference. Yes,
there are business cycle movements, but only the Great Depression appears as even
a blip in the long run.
But, as I said, I am sympathetic to
Link and Maggor. This apparently inexorable growth requires explanation. And incantations
about capitalism and entrepreneurial spirit won’t do the trick.
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