I forgot to add this to the post about new papers on economic history
Ran Abramitzky Economics and the Modern Economic Historian (ungated version here)
This is a blog about economics, history, law and other things that interest me.
Monday, November 9, 2015
economics of open access
The Chronicle of Higher Education has an interesting article on open access publishing. It notes what many open access advocates don't. Publishing, even online, requires resources, which costs money, which some has to provide.
One of the benefits of the traditional publishing model is that the customer, libraries, associations, and individual subscribers, paid. Consequently, journal editors had an incentive to provide a product that people were willing to buy.
In contrast many open access publishers charge a publication fee to the author. Unfortunately, this scheme does not create incentives to publish good papers. The publisher does not get compensated unless they publish the paper. While there are some legitimate open access publishers that charge a publication fee, many unethical entrepreneurs have stepped into the field to publish anything as long as they get paid. See Beall's list for some sense of how many there are. These publishers have an incentive to publish any crap as long as they get paid because they know that no one is going to read, let alone pay for, The International Journal of Business and Social Research or World Journal of Social Sciences.
I have had people try to defend the pay to publish model by saying that a lot of good journals charge fees. Those good journals charge submission fees. The incentives created by submission fees are exactly the opposite of those created by a publication fee. Submission fees encourage authors not to submit crap. Publication fees encourage journals to publish crap. They don't get paid if they don't publish the paper.
I'm not opposed to open access, and I certainly don't support Elsevier, but I don't like it when people champion open access without regard to the consequences.
One of the benefits of the traditional publishing model is that the customer, libraries, associations, and individual subscribers, paid. Consequently, journal editors had an incentive to provide a product that people were willing to buy.
In contrast many open access publishers charge a publication fee to the author. Unfortunately, this scheme does not create incentives to publish good papers. The publisher does not get compensated unless they publish the paper. While there are some legitimate open access publishers that charge a publication fee, many unethical entrepreneurs have stepped into the field to publish anything as long as they get paid. See Beall's list for some sense of how many there are. These publishers have an incentive to publish any crap as long as they get paid because they know that no one is going to read, let alone pay for, The International Journal of Business and Social Research or World Journal of Social Sciences.
I have had people try to defend the pay to publish model by saying that a lot of good journals charge fees. Those good journals charge submission fees. The incentives created by submission fees are exactly the opposite of those created by a publication fee. Submission fees encourage authors not to submit crap. Publication fees encourage journals to publish crap. They don't get paid if they don't publish the paper.
I'm not opposed to open access, and I certainly don't support Elsevier, but I don't like it when people champion open access without regard to the consequences.
Sunday, November 8, 2015
Recent papers about economic history
Claude Diebolt and Mike Haupert Clio’s Contributions to Economics and History
Friday, November 6, 2015
Isn't this what we are supposed to do?
Pseudoerasmus recently posted an analysis of the issues involved in the slave productivity debate. He also sent me a link to an interesting discussion between Edward Baptist and Trevon Logan on Twitter. I had previously noted Logan's review of Baptist's book in the JEH, which should be mandatory reading for anyone starting work in American history, economic or otherwise. I looked at some related tweets and saw that at
one point Baptist wondered who his critics were and what motivated them. He seemed bothered by the anonymity of Pseudoerasmus. I've heard that Alexander Hamilton and William Sealy Gosset published some interesting stuff under pseudonyms. Anyone who wants to know more about who
I am can click on the link to my CV in the upper right hand
corner. I know John Clegg is a historical sociologist at NYU. I don’t know
anything more about him. Pseudoerasmus is an anonymous blogger. I don’t know
who he is, and I don’t care. I evaluate what he writes, not who I think he is.
I also don’t know anything about Edward Baptist other than what he writes. For
all I know he might be a great guy. He may donate to the food bank and
volunteer at the homeless shelter. I wouldn’t be surprised to hear he does both. I haven’t written about who he is, I’ve written
my responses to things he has written.
As for the question of motivation, isn’t this what we are
supposed to do? One person makes an argument: they state a claim and try to
support it with logic and evidence. Other people respond to it. If they think the
argument is wrong they say so and explain their reasoning. In Time on
the Cross, Fogel and Engerman stated their theses, their reasoning and their evidence.
Many economists and historians pointed out errors in all three. To the best of
my knowledge, they did not ask what is motivating these guys; they (and their students) went looking for more evidence.
When I was at Washington University I
worked with Doug North (be the way yesterday was Doug’s birthday). Over a very
long career, Doug was wrong more than a few times. For example, the central
thesis of Economic Growth of the United States does not seem to have been
supported by subsequent research. He once told me that the only real benefit of
getting older was that he had learned a lot of things that did not work. Doug
always seemed to be much more concerned about what he was going to do than with
what he had done. Again, he once told me that his aim was to correct his errors
before others did. In our economic history seminars we did not sit around telling
each other how wonderful we were. My recollection is that people tried to find every potential flaw. I once asked John Nye if he hadn't been awfully hard on someone (not me). John said, "He's a big boy."
So, I don’t understand this question about the identity of
critics or their motivation. It doesn’t matter who I am. It matters what I write.
I do it because it’s what I am supposed to do. Edward Baptist
wrote a book related to American economic history. My primary field is American
economic history. The book was getting a lot of attention, and I thought it was
seriously flawed. I wrote about those flaws.
Wednesday, November 4, 2015
More and more capitalism and slavery
Sunday, November 1, 2015
Even More on Capitalism and Slavery
The Junto Blog post regarding slavery and capitalism prompted
a discussion in the comment section, which Edward Baptist joined in on. He
argued that he had not misrepresented the work of Olmstead and Rhode but then
doubled down and presented an even more misleading version of their work.
Baptist writes that
“I
argue that they adopt a new system around 1800, more or less, as evidenced by
the narratives of survivors, which is supported by the very existence of
systematic cotton-picking data itself. (It’s unclear, in Olmstead and Rohde’s
argument) why their data even exists.)
In their paper in the Journal of Economic History, Olmstead and Rhode state that planters kept record books of the pickings of individual
slaves and that
“Failing to
meet picking standards had severe consequences. In 1834 S. A. Townes of Marion,
Alabama threatened to "make those bitches go at least 100 [pounds] or whip
them like the devil.” In the 1830s Dr. J. W. Monett of Mississippi asserted
that after weighing an individual's daily picking, masters would whip slaves
for light or trashy picking. On several occasions, Louisiana planter Bennet
Barrow ordered a whipping for all hands because the output was too low. As yet
another example, John Edwin Fripp of South Carolina recorded
"popping" and "switching" his slaves for light picking. On
the Mississippi plantation of John Quitman and Henry Turner, a number of slaves
ran away rather than face punishment for light or trashy picking.”
In other words, they argued, based on the evidence, that the
slaveholders used the combination of detailed record keeping and whipping to maximize the productivity of slaves. In addition, they found that the average pounds of cotton picked
by a slave increased over time.
There are essentially two ways that this increase
over time could have occurred. First, slaves could have been forced to pick
closer to the maximum that they were physically capable of. Second, the maximum
that they were physically capable of picking increased over time. O & R argue for the second explanation. Improved plants enabled slaves to pick more
cotton in a given amount of time. In other words, slaveholders used physical
coercion to force slaves to pick at maximum picking rates and through plant
breeding they were able to increase this maximum amount that a person was
physically capable of picking overtime.
Baptist’s alternative seems to be that the maximum remained relatively
stable (he acknowledges that improved plants may have played some role), but
planters became more effective at forcing people to produce up to the maximum.
But this explanation poses several problems.
1.
Why were early slaveholders so bad at pushing
people to their capacity? Keep in mind that all the records on picking are from
slaveholders who kept picking books, yet picking rates in the 1820s appear to
have been well less than half of those in the ‘40s and ‘50s.
2.
Why didn’t these techniques carry over to other
crops (sea island cotton and sugar)
The two problems are illustrated with the following figures
from O & R.
Finally, Baptist now seems to make much of the claim that
productivity fell after the war, suggesting that this somehow contradicts O & R's argument. He claimed that there was a consensus on the decline in
productivity. I pointed out that there was not a consensus on the issue and
that the data used to estimate productivity after the war are not strictly
comparable to that from the antebellum picking books. Personally, I suspect
there was probably a decline in productivity. But a decline in productivity is
consistent with O & R’s argument. Why? Because they assumed that physical
coercion was used to push slaves throughout the period. If you remove it
productivity will fall. Pseudoerasmus notes in the comments section at the
Junto that the sources Baptist cites are more consistent with O & R's
argument than they are with his.
Thursday, October 29, 2015
Some Big Question Economic History
Joel Mokyr on the Culture of Growth
Working paper by Koyama, Moriguchi and Sng on the development of state capacity in China and Japan.
And Mokyr on the Needham Paradox
Working paper by Koyama, Moriguchi and Sng on the development of state capacity in China and Japan.
And Mokyr on the Needham Paradox
Tuesday, October 27, 2015
More on Capitalism and Slavery
There is more discussion of capitalism and slavery over at the Junto, prompted by Robin Balckburn's review of Emprire of Cotton and John Clegg's essay in the most recent issue of Critical Historical Studies. Clegg points out a number of problems with the arguments made by Baptist and Beckert, which I (here, here and here) and Pseudoerasmus had noted. Clegg also argues that for the new history of capitalism to be fruitful it needs to grapple with the definition of capitalism.
Sunday, October 18, 2015
Christine Exley the Economic Rockstar
The latest edition of Economic Rockstar Podcast features Christine Exley of the Harvard Business School. Among other things, she talks about how she came to study economics at the University of Mary Washington.
Thursday, September 24, 2015
Disruption Disrupted
The Chronicle
of Higher Education examines challenges to Clay Christensen’s theory of
disruption. His The Innovator’s Dilemma has become one of the bestselling and most
influential books on business strategy. The
historian Jill Lepore wrote an
interesting critique of Christensen’s work for the
New Yorker last year. Now, Andrew King and Baljir Baatartogtokh have a new paper in
MIT Sloan Management Review, asking “How
Useful is the Theory of Disruptive Innovation?” King
and Brent Goldlfarb also have evidence of broader problems in empirical
research in management (the problem they examine is not unique to management
research). The Chronicle article is interesting both on the specific issue of
Christensen’s theory but also on the difficulty King faced in publishing a challenge to Christensen’s work:
“King and Tucci presented their findings at a
conference in 1999. King recalls sitting at a restaurant soon after and a
well-known figure in the field approached, shook his hand, and said,
"You’re the guy who burst Christensen’s bubble." But it didn’t turn out
that way. "We wrote a couple of papers, which we had to tone down a little
bit because of the referees," says Tucci. The paper — working title:
"Wrong. Wrong. Wrong." — was too polemical, they were told. When it
finally appeared in Management Science, in 2002, the article had been smothered
in theory and jargon. The published title: "Incumbent Entry Into New
Market Niches: The Role of Experience and Managerial Choice in the Creation of
Dynamic Capabilities." As Brent Goldfarb, an associate professor of management
at the University of Maryland business school and friend of King, says,
"You have to look really hard to realize King and Tucci slaughtered
Christensen." - See more at: http://chronicle.com.ezproxy.umw.edu/article/The-Undoing-of-Disruption/233101/#sthash.LUXodkFg.dpuf
The historian's craft and economics
My paper (with Mary Eschelbach Hansen) “The
historian’s craft and economics” is now available on First View at the Journal of Institutional Economics:
Abstract
History refers both to the past and to the systematic study of
the past. Attempts to make a case for history in economics generally emphasize
the first definition. There are benefits from increased attention to the past.
This paper argues that significant benefits can be gained from increased
attention to the systematic study of the past, the historian's craft. The
essence of the historian's craft is the critical evaluation of sources. Failure
to critically evaluate sources has the potential to lead to erroneous
conclusions, whether one is using historical documents or more recently created
data.
Saturday, August 29, 2015
Economics really needs better critics
Per
Byland recently complained that economists had killed economics
“What
we have seen over the course of the last eighty years is a systematic
dismantling of the contribution of economics to our understanding of the social
world. Whatever the cause, modern economics is now not much more than formal
modeling using mathematics dressed up in economics-sounding lingo."
I’m not sure that Bylund and Michael Lind would
agree on much, but Lind
also has seen the destruction of economics
“Before World War II, economics — the
field which had replaced the older “political economy” — was contested between
neoclassical economics, which sought to model the economy with the methods of
physics, and the much more sensible and empirically-oriented school of
institutional economics. Another name for institutional economics was the
Historical School. After 1945, the institutional economics associated in the
U.S. with John Kenneth Galbraith was purged from American economics faculties,
in favor of the “freshwater” (Chicago) and “saltwater” (MIT) versions of
mathematical economics, which focused on trying to model the economy using
equations as though it were a fluid or a gas.”
Either Bylund and
Lind are completely out of touch with what economists are doing now or I am.
Their critique of economics is an old one. I’m not sure it ever really applied,
but it does not now. The American Economic Review and other top journals are
full of empirical research, not lots of new papers about General Equilibrium.
What sort of work do
economists admire? Here are the John Bates Clark medalists since 1990. How many
are known as pure theorists and how many are known for the empirical research?
1991
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1993
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1995
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1997
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1999
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2001
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2005
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2007
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2009
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2010
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2011
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2012
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2013
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2014
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2015
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Bylund and Lind seem to think that economists all aspire
to be Samuelson, Arrow or Debreu. Yes formal models with lots of imposing math
are still to be found, but more often than not they lead in to empirical
research.
Are there things that economist can do better? Yes.
I, for instance wish that economists would give as much attention to the
evidence that they use as they do to the formal model and the choice of econometric
techniques. On the topic, Mary and I have a paper on “The Historian’s Craft and
Economics” that I am happy to say was just accepted by Journal of
Institutional Economics. I also wish they would give more attention to
history generally, but I’m not really an unbiased source on that topic.
Round table on Edward Baptist's Half has Never Been Told
The September Journal of
Economic History has a round table of reviews of Edward Baptist’s book The Half Has Never Been told, with
reviews by Alan Olmstead, Jonathan Pritchett, Trevon Logan and Peter Rousseau. They
each address different aspects of the way that Baptist misrepresents the
historiography of American slavery and makes things up. Thanks to Alan Olmstead
for mentioning one of my
blog posts on the book. Many of the points noted in these reviews are similar to ones that I and Pseudoerasmus
made about the book shortly after it came out, around the same time it was
getting glowing reviews in places like the New York Times Book Reviews. I found
Logan’s review particularly interesting when it stepped away from what is
typically thought of as economic history. He concludes
I think as an economic historian I was so offended by the
books portrayal of economic historians I may have missed some of the bigger
problems.
Tuesday, August 18, 2015
Tariffs and the Civil War, or 95% of All Statistics Are Made Up
A recent letter
to the editor of our local paper argued that secession and the Civil War
were caused by high tariffs not slavery. The Confederate states were rebelling
against high taxes and big government. Apparently, they were really just Reagan
Republicans or maybe even libertarians (slaveholding libertarians). The author
of the letter made the claim that the South paid 75 percent of the tariff
revenue in 1859. I thought the claim was so outrageous he must have just made it up. It turns
out you can find this claim all over the internet. It turns out it even has
academic credentials behind it. Some people attribute it to Walter
Williams, but he appears to have gotten it from Thomas Di Lorenzo, who
attributed it to Frank Taussig’s The
Tariff History of the United States. Di Lorenzo, however, did not
provide a page citation. I suspect that he did not provide a page citation
because one does not exist. If someone can find this in Taussig please let me
know.
In any case, it is not true that
most revenue came from Southern ports. A small fraction of tariff revenue came
from Southern ports. In 1860 the Secretary of the Treasury reported the amount
of revenue collected in each collection district between 1854 and 1859. (Sen.
Ex. Doc. No. 33 36th Congress 1st Session). Looking at
1857, for instance, one finds that total revenue was $64,171,034. Most of the
revenue, $42,510,753, came as it did every year from a single port: New York.
The most important port in the South was New Orleans, which brought in a little
more than $3 million, less than half as much as Boston. Southern ports were not
even close to being the most important source of revenue.
There is no mystery as to why Southern
states seceded. They issued secession proclamations explaining their actions. South
Carolina was the first to secede, and the state’s proclamation does not mention
tariffs. It is entirely
about the perceived threat to slavery. It declares that
“A geographical line has been drawn across
the Union, and all the States north of that line have united in the election of
a man to the high office of President of the United States, whose opinions and
purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the administration
of the common Government, because he has declared that that "Government
cannot endure permanently half slave, half free," and that the public mind
must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction.”
Apparently we are to believe that they were simply hiding their true
motivation, opposition to tariffs. I wish modern defenders of the Confederacy
were as honest as its original defenders.
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