Kudos to Cabell's

Cabell's is taking a stand against fake journals:

"Unfortunately, academic publishing has been rife with fraudulent procedures over the past several years. Instances of deceptive practices and outright fraud have skyrocketed. Understandably, this has led to a significant erosion of trust in the scholarly publication process. In an effort to offer our users guidance and to support our mission of providing academics with accurate information and reputable outlets for publication, Cabell’s has launched a reevaluation initiative whereby selected journals appearing in our Directories will be examined according to new, more stringent criteria on a rotating basis throughout the year. Journals are selected for reevaluation based on inclusion in Jeffery Beall’s 2014 List of Predatory Publishers, exclusion from DOAJ and/or OASPA, and not meeting requirements of the Cabell’s Selection Policy. As these selected journals undergo this reevaluation process, they will be removed from our database. Essentially, these journals will be reapplying for inclusion. Journals will be evaluated according to the Cabell’s Selection Policy. Each journal’s editor or publisher will be asked to complete a new Application for Inclusion. Our Journal Admissions Department will verify that all journals reapplying for inclusion meet the required criteria. This comprehensive reevaluation process is expected to be completed by the end of 2015."

More on the History of Capitalism

Tom Cutterham has a post at the Junto about both the recent Shenk essay in The Nation and the discussion in the recent issue of Journal of American History.

Apostles of Growth

Timothy Shenk's essay on the the new history of capitalism.

Transcontinental Railroad

The Linda Hall Library in Kansas City has a cool web exhibit about railroads.

International economic history data

https://www.clio-infra.eu/

A Failure of Regulation: Reinterpreting the Panic of 1907

The Autumn 2014 issue of Business History Review is out now. It contains my paper on New York city trust companies during the panic of 1907.

This is the abstract for the paper

                 Financial Regulation and the Panic of 1907

 

Lax regulation enabled trust companies to take excessive risks, according to previous studies of the Panic of 1907, leading to a loss of confidence and massive runs. These studies have, however, given relatively little attention to the historical development of trust companies. This article argues that a more historical perspective can lead to a better understanding of the institutional framework and the actions of trust companies. Depositors did not lose confidence because of inadequate regulation; depositors lost confidence in specific trust companies because of false rumors, and diversity among trust companies hindered cooperation to halt the Panic.

The Back of Ed Baptist's Envelope

I have finally had a chance to read some more of Edward Baptist’s The Half Has Never Been Told.

A central claim of the book is that slavery was not just an important institution in American economic growth but that “the returns from the cotton monopoly powered the modernization of the rest of the American economy.” Baptist provides a back of the envelope accounting of the impact of slave produced cotton.

 

Baptist The Half has Never Been Told (page 321-2)

 

“But here’s a back- of- the –envelope accounting of cotton’s role in the US economy in the era of slavery expansion. In 1836, the total amount of economic activity―the value of all the goods and services produced―in the United States was about $1.5 billion. Of this, the value of the cotton crop itself, total pounds multiplied by average price per pound―$77 million―was about 5 percent of that entire gross domestic product. This percentage might seem small, but after subsistence agriculture, cotton sales were the largest single source of value in the American economy. Even this number, however, barely begins to measure the goods and services directly generated by cotton production. The freight of cotton to Liverpool by sea, insurance and interest paid on commercial credit―all would bring the total to more than $100 million (see Table 4.1).

                Next come the second- order effects that comprised the goods and services necessary to produce cotton. There was the purchase of slaves―perhaps $40 million in 1836 alone, a year that made many memories of long marches forced on stolen people. Then there was the purchase of land, the cost of credit for such purchases, the pork and the corn bought at the river landings, the axes that the slaves used to clear land and the cloth they wore, even the luxury goods and other spending by the slaveholding families. All of that probably added up to about $100 million more.

                Third order effects, the hardest to calculate, included the money spent by millworkers and Illinois hog farmers, the wages paid to steamboat workers, and the revenues yielded by investments made with the profits of the merchants, manufacturers, and slave traders who derived some or all of their income either directly or indirectly from the southwestern fields. These third order effects would also include the dollars spent and spent again in communities where cotton related trades made a significant impact another category of these effects is the value of foreign goods imported on credit  sustained the opposite flow of cotton. All these goods and services might have added up to $200 million. Given the short term of most commercial credit in 1836, each dollar “imported” for cotton would be turned over about twice a year: $400 million. All told more than $600 million, or almost half of the economic activity in the United States in 1836, derived directly or indirectly from cotton produced by the million odd slaves― 6 percent of the total US population―who in that year toiled in labor camps on slavery’s frontier.”

 

Where do I begin? The approach is fundamentally flawed. Baptist begins with gross domestic product (GDP), the value of all the final goods and services produced in the country during the year. He refers to this as a measure of the total economic activity. He notes that the value of cotton production equaled about 5 % percent of GDP. No problems so far. But he then adds the cost of the inputs to the production of cotton. Anyone who has taken Principles of Macroeconomics knows that you can’t do this; it is referred to as double counting. If I buy $1000 worth of wood and then make it into a table that I sell for $1,500, we do not add $1,000 and $1,500 because the value of the wood is included in the value of the table, the final good. If he is going to engage in double counting for cotton he would need to engage in double counting for all other goods. He then adds the costs of transportation and insurance; these only count toward US GDP to the extent that they are produced by Americans. He also adds the sales of assets: land and slaves. Again, the sales of assets are not counted in GDP. GDP only counts the value of final goods and services produced during the year. Not all purchases are counted as part of GDP. Only purchases of newly produced goods and services are counted in GDP.  Comparing his calculation of economic activity related to cotton to GDP is meaningless.

 

There is, however, an even deeper problem with this back of the envelope accounting:

perhaps $40 million

probably added up to about $100 million

might have added up to $200 million

 

Baptist is simply pulling numbers out of thin air, or a hat, or wherever it is that he gets them. Back of the envelope calculations tend to involve simplifying assumptions. Baptist seems to understand the term to mean that he can just make things up. The only reference provided is to Table 4.1. Table 4.1 does not provide, as one might assume, information about shipping and insurance. It does not even have any information at all for the year 1836.

Both historians and authors of fiction tell stories, but the stories that historians tell are distinguished from fiction by their grounding in the sources. Historians are constrained to tell stories that they can support with evidence from their sources. Baptist has thrown off this constraint and set himself free to simply make up numbers (or events). This really is a new history of capitalism.

Economic History's Many Muses

Many of the papers from the the Library Company of Phildelphia Program on Early American Economy and Society's conference on Economic History's Many muses are available here.