Nice piece by Michael Keenan Gutierrez about eradicating cholera in New
York, largely through public investment in sewers. I think he may have overemphasized
the ability of the wealthy to avoid exposure. Oliver Hicks the president of the
Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, for instance, died during the 1832 outbreak. The
cynic in me suspects that the deaths of the wealthy may have played a
disproportionate role in promoting public investment. Bob Higgs also emphasized
the importance of public investment in sewers and water filtration as a source
of decreasing mortality in the U.S. in his Transformation
of the American Economy, 1865-1914, which is not only mandatory reading for
anyone interested in economic history, but free. I’m generally not a huge fan
of the Mises Institute, but I thank them for making this book available to so
many people. Here are a couple of tables from the book illustrating the impact
of public investment in sewers and water filtration.
This is a blog about economics, history, law and other things that interest me.
Saturday, January 23, 2016
Friday, January 22, 2016
The stuff we don't agree on is the fun stuff
A lot of people have been talking about the latest Economist
article about why economics is different than “science”: whereas their peers in the natural sciences can edit genes and
spot new planets, economists cannot reliably predict, let alone prevent,
recessions or other economic events. Whenever
I read this sort of article I am left with the impression that the author doesn’t
understand economics or natural sciences.
1. It is not true that economic theory cannot
predict.
a.
In the
late 1990s and early 2000s demand for and prices of organic milk increased
rapidly. Economic theory suggests that in the absence of barriers to entry new
firms will enter the market and increase supply. The Northeast Organic Dairy
Producers Alliance reported that there was a 370 percent increase in the number
of organic dairy cows between 1997 and 2001.
Between 1990 and 2003 the number of organic dairy farms in Vermont
increased from 3 to 60 while the number of conventional farms fell from more
than 2,000 to 1,400. Events consistent
with the predictions of basic microeconomics happen all the time. The point is
that it is not news.
b.
People
make much of economists not predicting the financial crisis. The only problem
is that Schiller, Rajan, Schwartz, Roubini, Baker and others all gave warnings.
Moreover, the recession was predicted by this
very simple tool. By the way, based on that tool I am not currently
predicting a recession in the near future.
2.
No empirical research produces certainty. One of
my primary objectives when teaching quantitative methods is to emphasize that
statistical inference does not produce certainty. Whether you are historian
sifting through primary sources or an economist analyzing a random sample or
the population you are trying to understand a bigger picture that you can never
actually see directly and fully. Statistical inference does not provide
certainty; it enables you to quantify your uncertainty.
And by the way, economists didn’t do this.
3.
Not surprisingly, natural scientists do not
possess a giant pile of knowledge that they all hold with certainty.
b.
How many planets are in our solar system? Nine.
No. Eight. Wait. It’s nine. I think.
c.
Until relatively recently, most astronomers
thought that the expansion of the universe was decelerating.
4.
If they had such certain knowledge who would
want to study them? Why would any intelligent and curious person want to study
a discipline that has all the answers? Students in principles courses want the
answers. People who go on to graduate school do it because of the questions. I
really don’t think people become physicists because they want to be able to
pass on all the known certainties about the universe. The stuff we don’t agree
on is the fun stuff!
5.
As for the method of generating knowledge, McCloskey
noted quite a while ago (apparently while no one was listening) that economists,
physicists, sociologists, chemists, historians, etc. are all really doing the same
thing. They are trying to come up with something new to say and then persuade
other people that they are right. Natural scientists can often use controlled
experiments to generate persuasive evidence, but not always. Economists often
cannot run controlled experiments, but sometimes they can.
6.
In short, I find the whole “Is Economics A
Science” debate pointless.
Thursday, January 21, 2016
Noah Smith on Slavery and Economic Growth
In the long run, most wealth is produced,
not plundered. Slavery created bad institutions that inhibited
industrialization.
Yesterday I wrote about the response on Twitter to this
statement by Noah Smith and said that today I would write about my thoughts on
this statement.
In general, I tend to agree with Smith, largely because
plunder is not a sufficient condition for economic growth and innovation and
investment are. Plunder has existed throughout human history, and for most of
human history it did not lead to sustained economic growth. Spain and Portugal
did plenty of plundering, and it did not lead to economic growth. Switzerland
became rich without much plundering. That said, the economic history of the
United States had plenty of both plunder and productivity improvement.
Economists generally define economic growth as increases in
real GDP per capita. That simply means that on average people produce more
goods and services than they did the year before. There are basically two ways
to increase output per person. First, you can give people more resources to
work with: more natural resources and more capital. Second, you can figure out
ways to get more output from the resources you have: you can create a cotton
gin, or a spinning jenny, or ways to refine crude oil into kerosene. Both were
at play in American economic growth.
Both the South and the North increased the amount of natural
resources through movement to the West. This is probably the most obvious role
for plunder in American economic growth: appropriation of land from Native Americans. But growth was not solely attributable to increases in land.
Capital increased as well. Capital is anything that has been produced in order
to increase production in the future. People most often associate capital with machines
and equipment, but roads, ports, and canals are important examples of capital
as well. There was a lot of new capital in the North, both public and private.
Investment in canals and railroads was more extensive in the North than in the
South. There were also more buildings, more mills, more agricultural equipment,
etc. But neither the increases in land or capital would have really transformed
economic life. Simply increasing the amount of land, the number of sawmills,
and the number of spinning wheels and looms would not have led to modern
economic growth. The fundamental source of growth was improvement in productivity,
coming up with new and better ways to do things. These changes in technology
were not just in cotton textiles and railroads and the other things people
associate with industrialization. The North was still an agricultural economy
and much of the growth came from improvements in crops, livestock and farm
machinery, see Olmstead and Rohde’s Creating
Abundance and David McClelland’s Sowing
Modernity: America’s First Agricultural Revolution .These changes in
technology are what made 1900 different than 1800 and 2000 different than 1900.
Can they be attributed to the cotton
economy of the South?
Cotton accounted for about 4 % of U.S. GDP. That is a lot
for one sector of the economy. After all, Fogel estimated that GDP would have only
been about 4 % lower in 1890 if you had wiped out all the railroads. The point
is that even during the antebellum period the US economy was highly
diversified. No one thing could drive growth. Four percent is big, but it does
not make slave produced cotton the driving force behind economic growth.
But Baptist’s argument is essentially that cotton provided
the stimulus for growth in the North. As I have pointed out previously
his attempt at calculating the spillover effects of cotton are nonsense. The biggest
problem with them is that he just makes up the numbers, but even if he had
produced the numbers through research it doesn’t make any sense to compare them
to GDP.
Putting aside Baptist’s nonsense calculation, his argument
is actually pretty old and has not stood the test of time. It is essentially the
argument that Doug North made in The
Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. It seemed like a
reasonable story given the evidence that Doug had collected, but subsequent research
generated evidence that contradicted the theory. First, work by a number of
economic historians (Gallman, Hutchison and Williamson, and Herbst) found that
Doug’s theory tended to underestimate the degree of regional self-sufficiency
and overestimate the importance of interregional trade. The evidence did not
support the conclusion that cotton was the driving force behind economic
growth. Second, much of the work done on early industrialization has emphasized
the role of intraregional trade. Much of early industrialization appears to
have been directed at local demand not demand from the South or Europe. Notable
contributions on this subject were made by Diane Lindstrom Economic
Development in the Philadelphia Region and more recently by David Meyer Roots
of American Industrialization or see his essay on Industrialization in
EH.Net’s Encyclopedia.
Finally, there are
reasonable arguments supported by evidence that slavery had a negative effect
on long run trends in per capita GDP. The more a region depended on slave labor
in the past the lower its per capita income now.
By the way, all of the studies I have mentioned are actual
empirical studies. Their authors did the hard work of collecting and analyzing
evidence, rather than setting in an office in, for example, Ithaca making up
numbers.
Finally, I will note that enslaved people may have made contributions
to economic growth that aren’t included in Baptist’s story. The McCormick
reaper is one of the most famous innovations in American economic history. McCormick
was from Virginia, and, according to at least some accounts, an enslaved
blacksmith, Jo Anderson, was instrumental in helping him develop a working
reaper. I think this example actually
supports Smith’s view about the negative effects of slavery. The vast majority
of enslaved people did not even have this sort of limited opportunity to
contribute to the sort of technological innovations that produce economic
growth. How much more rapid might economic growth have been if African
Americans had the same opportunities as Americans of European descent to
exploit their ingenuity? How much more rapid might economic growth be now if
African Americans had the same opportunities as others?
Wednesday, January 20, 2016
More Obnoxious Nonsense from Ed Baptist
Noah Smith tweeted this today.
In the long run, most wealth is produced, not plundered. Slavery
created bad institutions that inhibited industrialization.
Which prompted the following back and forth on Twitter.
Josh Mound Retweeted
Noah Smith
@Ed_Baptist
The following tweet seems to be almost the polar opposite of one of your book's
main args, right?
Josh Mound added,
Noah Smith @Noahpinion
In the long run, most wealth is produced, not
plundered. Slavery created bad institutions that inhibited industrialization.
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@JoshuaMound
The emergence of cotton slavery in the US South is pretty highly correlated
with the Industrial Revolution.
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@Ed_Baptist
Right, he goes on to say that b/c North industrialized first it shows slavery
was inefficient, which is also opp of your book.
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@Ed_Baptist
It's a pretty clear case of economists abstract anti-empirical theorizing on
historical issues that totally misses actual facts.
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@JoshuaMound
For the record (and as @Ed_Baptist
& I have discussed) abstract economic theorizing need not be wrong. http://economics.mit.edu/files/8975
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@Econ_Marshall @JoshuaMound agreed! But let's mark our
theories to data and analysis.
o LIKE1
10:53 AM - 20 Jan 2016 · Details
The remarkable thing about this is Baptist’s assertions about economists' abstract anti-empirical economic theorizing and the need to “mark our theories to data.”
This, again, is Baptist’s argument on the economic significance of slavery
In 1836, the total amount of economic
activity―the value of all the goods and services produced―in the United States
was about $1.5 billion. Of this, the value of the cotton crop itself, total
pounds multiplied by average price per pound―$77 million―was about 5 percent of
that entire gross domestic product. This percentage might seem small, but after
subsistence agriculture, cotton sales were the largest single source of value
in the American economy. Even this number, however, barely begins to measure
the goods and services directly generated by cotton production. The freight of
cotton to Liverpool by sea, insurance and interest paid on commercial
credit―all would bring the total to more than $100 million (see Table 4.1).
Next come the second- order effects that
comprised the goods and services necessary to produce cotton. There was the
purchase of slaves―perhaps $40 million in 1836 alone, a year that made many
memories of long marches forced on stolen people. Then there was the purchase
of land, the cost of credit for such purchases, the pork and the corn bought at
the river landings, the axes that the slaves used to clear land and the cloth
they wore, even the luxury goods and other spending by the slaveholding
families. All of that probably added up to about $100 million more.
Third
order effects, the hardest to calculate, included the money spent by
millworkers and Illinois hog farmers, the wages paid to steamboat workers, and
the revenues yielded by investments made with the profits of the merchants,
manufacturers, and slave traders who derived some or all of their income either
directly or indirectly from the southwestern fields. These third order effects
would also include the dollars spent and spent again in communities where
cotton related trades made a significant impact another category of these
effects is the value of foreign goods imported on credit sustained the opposite flow of cotton. All
these goods and services might have added up to $200 million. Given the short
term of most commercial credit in 1836, each dollar “imported” for cotton would
be turned over about twice a year: $400 million. All told more than $600
million, or almost half of the economic activity in the United States in 1836,
derived directly or indirectly from cotton produced by the million odd slaves―
6 percent of the total US population―who in that year toiled in labor camps on
slavery’s frontier.”
Put aside the fact that he is comparing GDP to things that
are not counted in GDP. The really important thing to notice about Baptist’s
argument is this
“perhaps $40 million”
“probably added up to about $100 million more”
“might have added up to $200 million.”
These are not estimates based upon examination of historical
sources; Baptist simply made the numbers up. Even the one table that he refers to does not actually contain the suggested information. This is the empirical work, the
marking to data, that he engages in. Baptist’s argument is supported by neither
logic nor evidence. Apparently, Baptist’s supporters have either not actually read
the book, or they find this kind of “evidence” persuasive. If you find Baptist
persuasive you should probably stop reading this blog.
Tomorrow, I’ll write about my thoughts on Smith’s initial
statement.
New in Business History
The Business History conference has posted the Program for the 2016 Annual
Meeting.
There are many interesting looking sessions.
For instance
4.D Reinterpreting Early
Twentieth-Century U.S. Financial Markets
Location TBA
Chair: Edward Fertik, Yale University
Discussant: David Weiman, Barnard College
Location TBA
Chair: Edward Fertik, Yale University
Discussant: David Weiman, Barnard College
Leslie Hannah, London School of Economics
Reinterpreting Corporate Finance: Did the U.S. Really Lag Europe Before 1914?
Reinterpreting Corporate Finance: Did the U.S. Really Lag Europe Before 1914?
Mary O’Sullivan, Université de Genève
A Failed Revolution: The U.S. Securities Markets, the Call Market, and the Federal Reserve Act
A Failed Revolution: The U.S. Securities Markets, the Call Market, and the Federal Reserve Act
Eric Hilt, Wellesley College, and Carola Frydman, Kellogg School of Management
Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early Twentieth Century
Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early Twentieth Century
The last issue of the 2015 volume of Business
History Review is out. The editor's note describes the contents
Monday, January 11, 2016
Fleming on Slavery and the Civil War
The History
News Network posted a bizarre essay on slavery and the Civil War by Thomas Fleming.
I presume that it is based on his book, which, based on his essay, I have no
intention of reading. He suggests that he has a new understanding of the causes
of the Civil War. He notes that he is
“ forced to ask – not for
the first time – why Americans in general and scholars in particular do not
want to look at two solutions to slavery that might have avoided the holocaust
we call the Civil War and its aftermath of hate-laden racism. “
The first of these solutions that scholars do not want to
look at is compensated emancipation.
Not once but twice
Lincoln offered the South millions of dollars if they would agree to gradually
free their slaves over the next 40 or 50 years. With smears and sneers of rage
the South refused the offer. Why? –
Why? Perhaps it was because the value of slaves on the eve
of the Civil War is estimated to be about 3 billion dollars, not several
million. It has been estimated that even if the payments had been spread out
over twenty years the payments would have tripled the federal budget. See Roger
Ransom’s essay
at EH.NET for a quick review. The fact that it has been estimated suggests that
historians have considered this solution. Fleming seems to be suffering from “If
I haven’t read it, it hasn’t been written” syndrome.
I’m not going to go into Fleming’s second solution. The essence
of Fleming's argument is that there could be no peaceful emancipation because white
people in the South were afraid. Real historians, such as Alan Taylor, have
written about this fear, but they did not use it to make statements like
The South’s embrace of
slavery was not rooted in greed or a repulsive assumption of racial superiority.
I understand that HNN has a commitment to ideological
diversity, but they should also have some commitment to reasonable standards of
logic and evidence. Even if one were to make a reasonable case that fear had
come to dominate Southern thinking on emancipation during the Antebellum period,
how could you argue that slavery was not rooted in greed (profit seeking) and
racism: They originally imported African slaves as a humanitarian gesture
toward people that they regarded as equals? How exactly does that argument
work?
Thursday, January 7, 2016
The Cotton Kings
Brian E. Baker and Barbara Hahn’s new book The
Cotton Kings: Capitalism and Corruption in Turn of the Century New York and New
Orleans shows that it is possible to put capitalism in the title and still write
a good history book. I am not going to write a full review, but I will say that
I like the book. I’m not sure they are considered part of the new history of
capitalism; if they are, the field has taken a turn in a positive direction.
Their objective is not to make any sweeping generalizations about capitalism but to examine how it actually functioned in a particular instance. Their focus
is first and foremost on understanding what happened. How did people at the
cotton exchanges manipulate prices and why did it matter?
In The Cotton Kings
people do things. People create the rules that govern markets, they manipulate
the rules of those markets, and they form networks and use courts and
legislatures to pursue their goals. Sometimes they create rules that bring
great benefits to a small number of people; at other times they create rules that
spread the benefits more broadly.
They also did two interesting things in terms of
the telling of the story. Historians generally struggle with the tension between
telling a story so that historians in their field will appreciate it and telling
a story so that others will appreciate it. Stories about business, especially those
that involve finance, can be particularly difficult to tell. We can’t all have
Selena Gomez get people to pay attention to explanations of financial instruments.
Baker and Hahn use two devices to try to ease this tension. The first is that
terms regarding markets are highlighted throughout the text and defined in a
glossary at the end of the book. The approach provides the necessary
information without long interruptions in the story. The second device is to
place an essay on sources at the end of the book. The term essay on sources may
be a bit misleading; it is not about the primary sources. The essay on sources
is actually a historiography. It places the book in the literature for
other historians. Typically, this discussion would be at the beginning, telling
historians why the book is important. Baker and Hahn try to sell the story on
its own merits as an interesting and important chapter in American history. I
would have actually liked more discussion of the primary sources and how they
were used, but that may just be my preference. I find historians stories about
how they write history almost as interesting as the history itself.
Friday, January 1, 2016
Rothman on Slavery and Capitalism
Joshua Rothman has written an essay
on the new history of capitalism and slavery. In it he illustrates some of
the fundamental problems with the recent work in this area.
First, he perpetuates the misleading historiography that claims
the new historians of capitalism have overturned the old orthodoxy that slavery
was apart from capitalism, pretending that economic historians had not been
making that argument for over a half century.
Second, although he acknowledges that there have been
critics, rather than addressing their claims, he writes them off as a matter of
dogma rather than analysis. Evidently it is dogma to oppose inaccurate
historiography. And it is dogma to expect a historian not to make
up evidence. I am willing to say that I subscribe to this dogma.
Yet, as Rothman points out, this work seems to appeal to
many people. It seems particularly timely as people worry about the ongoing effects
of financial crises, increasing inequality and racial discrimination. This
appeal is in some ways the most fundamental problem with the new history of
capitalism. “Like my book because I claim that capitalism was the driving force
behind the brutality of slavery.” “Like my book because it shows that slavery
was the driving force behind American economic growth.” Numerous fans of
Baptist’s book have observed that he showed that slave grown cotton accounted
for half of economic activity in 1836. But anyone no one who actually reads pages 321
and 322 can fail to see that the numbers are made up and then aggregated in
ways that make no sense. People have, however, chosen to overlook that if they
like the conclusion. And this is the most fundamental problem: people evaluating
someone’s work based upon how well it fits their preconceptions rather than the
actual quality of the work.
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