I just listened to an episode Econ
Roots, in which Mike
Munger was interviewed about the importance of Douglass C. North. Like
myself, Munger went to Washington University and worked with North. His answer
to why North was important was that “he had a view of economic history that
took time seriously.” He notes, for example, that North would ask about where
preferences came from rather than taking them as given.
It is a great podcast episode, but my personal answer to the
question would be slightly different because I had recognized the importance of
explain changes in institution over time before I read North. As an
undergraduate at the The Evergreen State College the two books that had the
biggest impact on me were Samuelson’s Economics and Thorstein Veblen’s Theory
of the Leisure Class.
The neo-classical economics of Samuelson immediately made
sense to me. I found the use of models to analyze individuals maximizing subject
to constraints and interacting with other people doing the same to be an
incredibly powerful tool.
Then I read Veblen. Veblen argued that economic theory was fine
as far as it went, but it didn’t go far enough. In his first book, The
Theory of The Leisure Class (1899), he explained that, "The
institutions are, in substance, prevalent habits of thought with respect to
particular relations and to particular functions of the individual and of the
community: and the scheme of life, which is made up of the aggregate of
institutions in force at a given point in the development of any society, may
on the psychological side be broadly characterized as a prevalent spiritual
attitude, or theory of life." (Veblen 1912, 190) Thus, “the evolution of
society is substantially a process of mental adaption on the part of
individuals under the stress of circumstances which will no longer tolerate
habits of thought formed under and conforming to circumstances in the
past." (Veblen 1912, 192) To Veblen this process of cultural change should
be the central concern of economists: He argued that both the preferences and
constraints that economic theory takes as given change over time and answering
the biggest questions in economics requires understanding how they change over
time.
So, I was persuaded of both the utility of economic theory
and the need to explain how the things that influences those choices, including
preferences, change over time.
I know that Doug read Veblen when he was younger, but I don’t
think he was influenced by him, at least consciously. I don’t know if he ever
read Samuelson. Yet what North provided me was a link between institutional
change and economic theory. And the link ran in both directions. He provided an
approach that made it possible to talk about the impact of institutions on
market performance and to use economic theory to try to understand how institutions
changed. The idea of transaction costs provided a means to connect different
institutional arrangements to the performance of markets. Transactions costs
create a wedge between buyers and sellers. The more resources you must use
trying to enforce agreements or protect your property the less mutually
beneficial trades will exist. Effective institutions can lower the cost of
transactions, encouraging trade, investment, and innovation. Economic models can also be used to try to
explain differences in institutions and how they change over time. The first
thing I read by North was a “Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic
History,” followed immediately by Structure and Change. In both he used
a simple model of a wealth maximizing ruler to explain institutions that do not
maximize economic output. He asked why wealth maximizing ruler might not create
rules that maximized output for the country, creating the largest possible pool
of wealth to extract revenue from. The answer in this model was that the ruler
faced a transaction cost constraint and a competition constraint. The wealth
maximizing institutions might entail higher costs of collecting taxes than institutions
that lead to lower levels of output. For instance, selling a monopoly might be
an easy way to raise revenue but not one that is likely to maximize output. This
is the transaction cost constraint. The competition constraint arises from the
fact that wealth maximizing institutions might be ones that enhance the power
of potential competitors to the ruler. For instance, international trade might
increase output but also increase the wealth and power of people who present a
potential threat to the ruler.
For me, Doug’s work meant that I didn’t have to choose between
Samuelson and Veblen.
North, Douglass C. "A framework for analyzing the state
in economic history." Explorations in economic history 16, no. 3
(1979): 249.
North, Douglass Cecil. Structure and change in economic
history. Norton, 1981.