This blogpost was prompted by Marc Parry’s
Shackles
and Dollars article in the Chronicle of Higher Education. Specifically,
the idea attributed to Eric Foner that counterfactuals are a waste of time.
There was extensive discussion of the issue on Twitter by Pseudoerasmus, Kevin
O’Rourke, Leah Boustan, Vincent Geloso and others, which
Brad
DeLong collected, and a blogpost by
Dietrich Vollrath.
What follows is my attempt to provide some background on the
use of counterfactuals in historical analysis and my thoughts on the extent to
which there is a methodological divide between historians and economists
regarding counterfactuals.
For any reader of this blog who is not an economist,
historian, philosopher, or science fiction fan, I would describe a counterfactual
history as an interpretation of the past that intentionally departs from
generally accepted evidence. The Man in the High Castle, for
instance, is a counterfactual. The generally accepted evidence is that Germany
and Japan surrendered; they did not win the war.
Historians asking people to think about how things might
have been is not new. Consider this
example from G.D.H Cole’s Introduction to
Economic History, 1750-1950 (first published in 1952):
“After delays caused
by the difficulties of internal migration, the displaced villagers and their
children provided the chief supply of labor for the new factories, and without
this reservoir of dis-employed labor the revolution in industry would perforce
have been greatly slowed down.”.
Cole is asking you to imagine what would have happened if
there had not been an enclosure movement in England. Such statements about what
might have been did not really attract much attention until a group of
economic historians started to write about counterfactuals in the late 1950s and
early 1960s.
To the best of my knowledge, Meyer and Conrad (1957) were the first to introduce the explicit use of
counterfactuals in economic history, making the argument that statemtns about causality always involved a counterfactual. Counterfactuals do
not, however, seem to have attracted much attention until Robert Fogel used a
counterfactual to estimate the extent to which economic growth was caused by
railroads in the nineteenth century. He asked what would the economyhave looked like if there were no railroads in 1890. He concluded that railroads accounted for a
relatively small part of the growth in the nineteenth century.
Fogel’s analysis prompted numerous critical responses. Some
of the critical responses from economic historians focused on the details of
Fogel’s counterfactual rather than the use of counterfactuals (David 1969). Some
traditional historians completely dismissed the use of a counterfactuals. E.P. Thompson referred to it as Geschichtwissenschlopff.
E.H. Carr called it a parlor game. David Hacket Fisher included the use of
counterfactuals in his book on Historical
Fallacies, referring to it as the fallacy of the fictional question. Fritz
Redlich called them “figments.”
Albert Fishlow also used a counterfactual, in his analysis
of the impact of railroads, but neither attracted as much critical attention as
Fogel’s work. Why did people respond so
strongly to Fogel’s work? Part of the response was no doubt due to Fogel himself.
He was not just an advocate for new methods, he was evangelist: Throw down your
old methods, and follow me, and I will make you scientific historians. But Fogel’s
counterfactual also required a much greater leap of the imagination than
Fishlow’s. It is much easier to imagine a world without the less than 30,000
miles of track that existed in 1859 than it is to imagine a world in which more
than 160,000 miles of track have been removed. Fogel compounded that leap of
the imagination by asking you to imagine a world that had adapted to the lack
of railroads by expanding roads and canals. Both used counterfactuals, but
Fishlow only asked you to get rid of the railroads and look at the roads and
canals that were actually there. Fogel is asking you to not just make a big
leap of the imagination but a very explicit one. Fishlow’s was not as big or as
explicit. It is very easy to slip into the notion of thinking of it as a parlor
game, or now a computer game, like Robber Baron.
Fogel’s counterfactual required a large leap of the imagination,
but it was not a parlor game. It is important to remember that Fogel’s argument
was not just against historians like Kirkland, it was against the economist W.
W. Rostow and his stages of growth theory, in which the take-off into self-sustaining
growth is driven by a leading sector like railroads. Moreover, the dispute with
Rostow mattered. Rostow had the ear of powerful people in the early 1960s,
people capable of actually influencing development policy (see Easterly 200 ,
31-33). In order to challenge Rostow,
Fogel needed to be able to estimate not just whether railroads mattered, but how much they mattered. Obviously many things were important to explaining economic growth in the United States in the nineteenth century. Fogel needed to be able to say to what extent, taking all those other things into consideration, railroads mattered.
Despite the negative responses to Fogel’s work, Foner’s
continued aversion to counterfactuals seems like a bit of history itself. Some
historians, such as Richard Evans, continue to oppose their use, but counterfactuals
have become pretty mainstream. Gary Kornblith (2003) has used a counterfactual
to examine the causes of the Civil War. Peter Coclanis and Stanley Engerman (2013)
debate whether slavery would have survived in the absence of a Civil War. Niall
Ferguson has edited a book of counterfactuals. Joe Crowley has edited two
volumes of
What If. Bunzl (2004)
provided a guide to the use of counterfactual for readers of the
American Historical Review.
Rebecca
Onion argues that more historians should consider the value of counterfactuals.
Foner’s student Sven Beckert writes the following on page 97 of Empire of Cotton.
I do think there are differences in the way that economists
and historians typically use counterfactuals. First, economists tend to use them
like Fogel to answer the question “To what extent did x cause y?” Consequently,
economists tend to focus on very precise counterfactuals that are embodied in
economic models, which incorporate all the relevant explanatory factors. (See Tim
Leunig’s
survey
of social savings studies for numerous examples.)
Second, historians are more likely to deal with questions
where the answer to “What caused y?” is a story about a series of events. Consequently counterfactual tend to be like Kornblith's, describing a series of events beginning with Henry Clay
winning the presidential election in 1844, events that he argues were not just possible
but plausible and can shed light on the causes
of the Civil War. Counterfactuals in this cases are less about the quantitative
significance than they are about the role of contingency in history. The
actions of one individual or the repercussions of one event can make a big
difference in these counterfactuals. Any one individual is pretty much
irrelevant in a Fogel style counterfactual.
In the end, although
there are differences, I do not think that counterfactuals present a
fundamental methodological divide between historians and economists. Not all
historians oppose the use of counterfactuals, and some economists (McAfee 1983)
seem to think they are silly.
Finally, the statement attributed to Foner was misleading in so far as it suggests that there is fundamental methodological divide between historians and economists over the use of counterfactuals.The statement was also inaccurate
because the economic historians that have challenged Baptist et al have not
done so on the basis of counterfactuals. It is instead, Baptist et al who have
created interpretations that are not based on actual evidence. One of the
primary features of Baptist’s book is that he overtly and covertly makes things
up.
Bunzl, Martin. "Counterfactual history: a user's
guide." The American historical review 109, no. 3 (2004):
845-858.
Coclanis, Peter A., and Stanley L. Engerman. "Would
Slavery Have Survived Without the Civil War?: Economic Factors in the American
South During the Antebellum and Postbellum Eras." Southern
Cultures 19, no. 2 (2013): 66-90.
Conrad, Alfred H., and John R. Meyer. "The economics of
slavery in the ante bellum South." The Journal of Political
Economy (1958): 95-130.
David, Paul. “Transport Innovation and Economic Growth: Professor
Fogel on and off the Rails” The Economic
History Review, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Dec., 1969), pp. 506-525.
Easterly, W. The
Elusive Quest for Growth (2001).
Fogel, Robert William. "A quantitative approach to the
study of railroads in American economic growth: a report of some preliminary
findings." Journal of Economic History (1962): 163-197.
Fogel, Robert W. "The new economic history." The
Economic History Review 19, no. 3 (1966): 642-656.
Fogel, Robert William.
"The specification problem in economic history." The Journal of Economic History 27, no. 03 (1967): 283-308.
Gary J. Kornblith. “Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War:
A Counterfactual Exercise.” The Journal
of American History, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Jun., 2003), pp. 76-105
McAfee, R. Preston. "American economic growth and the
voyage of Columbus." The American Economic Review 73, no.
4 (1983): 735-740.
Meyer, John R., and Alfred H. Conrad. "Economic theory,
statistical inference, and economic history." The Journal of
Economic History 17.04 (1957): 524-544.
Redlich, Fritz. "New" and Traditional Approaches
to Economic History and Their Interdependence.” The Journal of Economic History Vol. 25, No. 4 (Dec., 1965), pp.
480-495.