Hobbes and GameTheory

In Hobbled by Hobbes Christopher Ryan argues that the anthropological and archeological evidence is inconsistent with Steven Pinker’s interpretation of long term trends in violence. I don’t yet have a firm opinion about that issue, but Ryan also refers to Pinker and others as neo-Hobbesian. He explains that

“For reasons having nothing to do with scientific accuracy, Hobbes’ dire sloganeering about the misery of pre-civilized human life echoes down the centuries. Who among us, three and a half centuries later, has not heard that our ancestors’ lives were “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”? This demonization of human existence in pre-state societies is essential to preserving the legitimacy of God and country—both of which run a protection racket promising to guard us against our own demonic inner nature. Hobbes’ infectious meme is certainly among the most famous phrases ever penned in the English language, and it shows no sign of fading. Indeed, his dismal view of human nature is still being enthusiastically spread by neo-Hobbesian presidents, pundits and professors.”

I have thought for some time that Hobbes view of human nature has been somewhat misinterpreted. In Chapter 11 of Leviathan he describes his view of human nature:

“So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death.”

 That does sound like a pretty dismal view of human nature, but then he explains:

“And the cause of this is, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate amount of power; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath at present without the acquisition of more.”

In Hobbes view the problem was less our demonic human nature than that people are essentially a prisoners’ dilemma type game, a multi-person arms race.

Just make it up

I have written several times about how Edward Baptist just makes up numbers for his estimate of the importance of slavery to American economic development. It turns out that he is on to something. Just making things up seems to be very popular in the social sciences now. Here is some recent just making things up in sociology, and here is some recent just making things up in political science. All of these examples share three things in common:

1.       They just made stuff up.

2.       It wasn’t that hard to see that they just made things up.

3.       The all got glowing reviews or awards because their conclusions confirmed the beliefs of the reviewers.

Of course, this isn’t really new

Anthropology

Psychology

More history

Sort of related to economic history

We just spent the weekend driving from Fredericksburg to St. Louis and back (for Mary's parents 60th anniversary). We stayed a night in Louisville because we wanted to eat at 610 Magnolia. The meal was very good, but we wished that there had been more Smoke and Pickles. We stayed a few blocks away from the restaurant at the Culbertson Mansion on 3^rd Street, one of the many amazing homes built along that street in the 1880s and 1890s. Our brief stay made me curious about the economic history of Louisville, particularly the Southern Exposition.

In St. Louis, we discovered the Urban Chestnut Brewing Company. While living in München  in the summer of 1997 I discovered that I had a taste for weissbier, and Urban Chestnut makes a very good one, though Schneider Weisse is still my favorite. If you are in St. Louis, the food at their Bierhall is also quite good.

Some big picture economic history

Robin Grier talks with Marshall Poe about The Long Process of Development: Building Markets and States in Pre Industrial England, Spain and the Colonies her new book with Jerry Hough at the New Books Network. She argues that state capability is an essential (though hard to develop) ingredient for economic growth.

Jeremy Adelman considers “What Caused Capitalism?” as he reviews some recent books.

Education, Economics and History

Here is a nice essay on the benefits of higher education from the New York Times.

 

Also from the New York Times is Mankiw on the economics of trade and the politics of trade.

 

Here is more from Pseudoerasmus on cotton and economic growth, highlighting McCloskey’s argument about the role of cotton in the Industrial Revolution.

 

Speaking of cotton and economic growth, The Half Has Never Been Told won two awards last week. I feel like the boy who said the emperor has no clothes, except I keep saying the Baptist has no evidence.

 

It is not a great work of history; it is not good work of history, and it should be obvious to any historian who reads the book.

 

1.       Baptist misrepresents the historiography of slavery and his references are often missing or misleading.  See also an earlier post of mine and the recent post by Pseudoerasmus

 

2.       Baptist makes glaring factual errors.

 

3.       Baptist does not make a pretense of using evidence to support some of his conclusions. To me the most obvious problem, one that even non-historians should be able to see, is the way that he makes up an estimate of the economic importance of slavery. Many people have suggested that the book shows how slavery was central to the development of the American economy. That argument hinges on this calculation, and the numbers in that calculation are clearly just made up. To me, this tendency to just make things up is the most damning of the problems with the book. Although it can’t be proven, I suspect that every book on history contains some error. We all make mistakes. Consequently, problems with historiography, facts and citation are matters of degree. It is difficult to say at what point such mistakes start to raise doubts about the book as a whole. On the other hand, making up numbers is not a mistake. It is not like misremembering a date, or name, or citation. It demonstrates a fundamental disregard for the role of evidence in historical argument.

What Is Capitalism?

S-USIH.org has the fourth of James Livingston’s essays on What is Called History at the End of Modernity. among other tings, Livingston is interested in recent assertions that slavery was capitalist. Like many of the people who have commented on the essay, I was reminded of the debate between Brenner and Wallerstein in the 1970s, but I also thought of this from Beckert’s Empire of Cotton

 

“In 1980 the Soviet Union produced nearly 6 billion pounds of cotton, making it the world’s largest producer after China. These stratospheric gains—production increased by about 70 percent between 1950 and 1966 alone—were only possible because of massive state investments in irrigation, fertilizers and machinery.

                Such recourse to the state in postcolonial and postcapitalist societies was not a return to the war capitalism of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but a sharpening of the tools and enhancing of the methods of industrial capitalism.” (Empire of Cotton pages 435-36)

Maybe I am reading this the wrong way, but it seems to say that the rapid growth of cotton production in the USSR and China was “a sharpening of the tools and enhancing of the methods of industrial capitalism.” It is not just slavery that is capitalist, communism is capitalist. If communism is capitalism, is capitalism a useful category for the analysis of economies?

Clearly, there is a place for the study of capitalism.  If nothing else, we need to try to understand how people have used the term in different places and times. What is not clear is how useful it is as a tool to analyze economic history.

In economics it seems to me that capitalism has largely gone out of fashion as a useful category for analysis. Economists used to write about capitalism on a regular basis (for example, Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy; Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom; and Williamson’s Economic Institutions of Capitalism).  Many departments of economics offered courses in Comparative Economic Systems that examined the differences between capitalism, communism and socialism. Comparative economic systems courses went out of fashion with the decline of communism. More generally, it wasn’t clear that traditional notions of what capitalism were useful for understanding big questions like growth and distribution.  New institutional economists generally seem to regard the old categories used in comparative economic systems as inadequate.

 

Standards of Accuracy in Historical Scholarship

At H-SHEAR Daniel Feller writes about Standards of Accuracy in Historical Scholarship in recent works by Johnson and Baptist and starts an interesting discussion.

 

Another Rant on Cotton and Growth

This is one of the reasons why books like Empire of Cotton and The Half has Never Been Told irritate me so much. People like Harold Myerson start spreading their misinformation in newspapers like the Washington Post. Myerson writes that

“For much of the 20th century, the prevailing view of the North-South conflict was that it had pitted the increasingly advanced capitalist economy of the North against the pre-modern, quasi-feudal economy of the South. In recent years, however, a spate of new histories has placed the antebellum cotton economy of the South at the very center of 19th-century capitalism. Works such as “Empire of Cotton,” by Harvard historian Sven Beckert, and “The Half Has Never Been Told,” by Cornell University historian Edward E. Baptist, have documented how slave-produced cotton was the largest and most lucrative industry in America’s antebellum economy, the source of the fortunes of New York-based traders and investors and of British manufacturers. The rise in profitability, Baptist shows, resulted in large part from the increased brutalization of the slave work force.”

Was the prevailing view that the South was quasi-feudal? No. Anyone who had read any economic history in the last 60 years knew better.

Was slave produced cotton the largest and most lucrative industry? No. Cotton was the largest export, but not the largest product; both wheat and corn exceeded cotton in the value of crops produced (based on estimates from De Bows Statistical View). Cotton production amounted to about 4 % of GDP.

 

Have they documented how slave produced cotton was the source of the fortunes of New York based traders and investors? No. I think this will be rather difficult for them to do. According to Albion’s Rise of New York Port, in 1860 only $12.4 million worth of cotton was exported from New York, while more than $96 million was exported from New Orleans, smaller southern ports like Charleston and Savanah also exported more cotton than New York. Cotton accounted for a small share of the more than $120 million in exports from New York. Moreover the $233 million in imports that came through New York dwarfed the value of exports from the port. In other words, cotton accounted for a relatively small share of the shipping activity in New York. In addition, while some New York investors no doubt profited from slavery, at least some others saw slavery as a liability in financial markets. When Lewis Curtis of the Farmers Loan and Trust Company wrote to the Rothschilds in June 1838, trying to interest them in bonds to finance railroad construction in Michigan, he underlined that “it is a Free State and Slavery is prohibited.”  I do not know that the Rothschilds cared, but Curtis clearly thought they might. The bottom line is that we do not yet know the extent to which fortunes of New York traders and investors were built on cotton. So far, it has only been asserted; it has not been established with evidence.

Maybe I am wrong, but at least I will tell you what evidence I am basing my conclusions on.